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ADEQUATE PUBLIC FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS:
REFLECTIONS ON FLORIDA'S CONCURRENCY SYSTEM
FOR MANAGING GROWTH
THomAS G. PELHAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
F LORIDA'S concurrency system is our nation's most ambitious ex-
periment in growth management for several reasons. First, it inte-
grates local capital improvements programming with the local land
development regulatory process. The integration of these two histori-
cally distinct processes is embodied in the concurrency requirement,
which provides that adequate public facilities shall be available con-
current with development. Second, this system is the first attempt to
implement the concurrency concept on a statewide basis, a truly mon-
umental task considering that Florida is the fourth largest and one of
our fastest growing states. Third, this system is being implemented as
part of a state, regional, and local planning process that has made
Florida the uncontested leader of the ongoing national movement to
reform traditional local development regulatory systems. This experi-
ment is being watched closely by other states, and some have already
borrowed from it. In Florida, with the dust still settling on the initial
implementation phase, the state's new concurrency system continues
to be the subject of much debate and controversy. A detailed exami-
nation of its origins, purposes, components, and flaws should be of
interest to those from other states as well as to affected Floridians.
II. OVERVIEW
The use of capital improvements controls as tools to manage
growth in rapidly urbanizing areas has increased dramatically in the
past two decades. These controls establish a connection between a lo-
cal government's capital improvements activities and the local land
planning and regulatory process. At the planning level, local capital
* Partner, Holland & Knight, Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., 1965, Florida State University;
M.A., 1967, Duke University; J.D., 1971, Florida State University; LL.M., 1977, Harvard Uni-
versity. From February 2, 1987, until January 31, 1991, the author was the Secretary of the
Florida Department of Community Affairs, which has responsibility for the implementation of
Florida's growth management legislation. He was a principal author of the Department's origi-
nal concurrency rule.
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improvements planning and programming are integrated with the lo-
cal comprehensive planning process. At the regulatory level, develop-
ment approvals for individual projects are linked to the provision or
availability of certain public facilities or services.'
The growing popularity of capital improvements controls is primar-
ily the result of two related trends. First, local officials and planners
have increasingly recognized the critical relationship between local
government capital improvement activities and the development proc-
ess. Local government decisions to construct public facilities or to
provide public services influence and frequently determine whether,
when, how, and where development occurs. Accordingly, local gov-
ernments have begun to integrate their capital improvement activities
with their land development planning and regulatory processes in an
effort to control the timing, type, location, and pattern of develop-
ment in their communities.2
Second, the judiciary has become more receptive to the use of capi-
tal improvement controls to manage growth. Traditionally, courts
treated local government facility and service providers in the same
manner as privately owned public utility companies. Thus, like the
public utility company, the purpose of the local government service
provider was deemed to be the provision of facilities and services to
accommodate growth.' Applying the public utility model, courts ini-
tially reacted negatively to local government efforts to use their capital
improvement activities to control growth. 4 During the past two dec-
ades, however, the judiciary has begun to react more favorably to the
use of capital improvement controls as tools for controlling land de-
velopment, especially if they are linked to or integrated with a plan-
1. See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JUIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 267-70 (2d ed. 1986); Stuart L. Deutsch, Capital Improvements
Controls as Land Use Control Devices, 9 ENvTL. L. 61 (1978); see also Robert H. Freilich & S.
Mark White, Transportation Congestion and Growth Management: Comprehensive Approaches
to Resolving America's Major Quality of Life Crisis, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 915, 941, 957-58
(1991).
2. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 1, at 267-70. As another commentator has
characterized the relationship: "Capital facilities are provided for land development purposes,
and they significantly influence when, where, how and if growth will occur." Deutsch, supra
note 1, at 100.
3. Deutsch, supra note 1, at 61, 64-65, 96-106.
4. Id. at 66-67. Robinson v. City of Boulder, 547 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1976), overruled by
Board of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe County v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 718 P.2d
235 (Colo. 1986), is the case most often cited to illustrate this judicial approach. The City of
Boulder denied the landowners' request to connect their proposed development project to the
municipal sewer and water system because the project was allegedly inconsistent with the coun-
ty's master plan. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the City could not refuse to serve the
project for nonutility reasons such as "land use planning considerations." Robinson, 547 P.2d
at 229.
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ning process.' This change in judicial attitude, along with increased
awareness of the impact of public infrastructure decisions on the de-
velopment process, has prompted local governments to make greater
use of capital improvement controls in their land use planning and
regulatory systems.
Among the capital improvements controls devised by local govern-
ments, perhaps the most popular is the adequate public facilities re-
quirement. This requirement makes the issuance of development
approvals contingent on the availability of adequate public facilities.
In some states, like Florida, the requirement is phrased in terms of
ensuring that facilities are available "concurrent" with development
or the impacts of development, hence the "concurrency require-
ment. ' 16 The terms "concurrency," "concurrency requirement," and
"adequate public facilities requirement" are used interchangeably in
this Article to refer to the legal mandate that development approval be
conditioned on the provision of public facilities and services.
Until recently, the enactment of adequate public facilities require-
ments was primarily a local government phenomenon. Following the
judicial sanction of these requirements in New York in 1972 in the
landmark case of Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo,7 local ade-
quate public facilities ordinances proliferated throughout the nation,
particularly in high growth areas.' For example, a recent survey re-
vealed that thirty percent of California's cities have adopted an ade-
quate public facilities requirement, making it the most commonly used
local growth management technique in that state.9
Enacted pursuant to home rule powers, traditional state zoning ena-
bling legislation,'0 or in some instances through the initiative and ref-
erendum process," these local regulations vary widely in stated
5. See generally Deutsch, supra note 1, at 82-111.
6. "It is the intent of the Legislature that public facilities and services needed to support
development shall be available concurrent with the impacts of such development." FLA. STAT. §
163.3177(10)(h) (1991).
7. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
8. Douglas R. Porter, The APFEpidemic, URB. LAND, Nov. 1990, at 36, 36.
9. Id. See also MADELYN GLICKFELD & NED LEviNE, REGIONAL GROWTH... LoCAL REAC-
TION: THE ENACTMENT AND EFFECTS OF LoCAL GROWTH CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT ME ASURES
iN CAuro Ar (1992).
10. The Ramapo ordinance establishing an adequate public facilities requirement for subdi-
vision approval was enacted pursuant to the New York zoning enabling act for towns. Ramapo,
285 N.E.2d at 296-97.
11. See generally Daniel F. Curtin, Jr. & M. Thomas Jacobson, Growth Control by the
Ballot Box: California's Experience, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1073 (1991). For a discussion of an
adequate public facilities ordinance recently enacted in the town of Walnut Creek, California,
through the initiative and referendum process, see Sanford Scaggs, Walnut Creek Says Nuts to
Growth, URB. LAND, Oct. 1988, at 34. The case of Associated Home Builders of Greater East-
bay v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976), describes, analyzes, and upholds another
adequate public facilities ordinance enacted by the voters of Livermore, California.
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purpose, scope, and detail and the extent to which they are linked to a
comprehensive planning framework. A few local governments have
enacted concurrency systems that encompass a wide range of public
facilities and are used to implement a comprehensive plan and growth
policy. For example, the adequate public facilities ordinance of Mont-
gomery County, Maryland, one of the oldest and most comprehensive
concurrency programs in the country,12 covers roads and public trans-
portation, sewer and water, schools, police stations, firehouses, and
health clinics. It creates a process for synchronizing the timing of pri-
vate development with the availability of public facilities in accor-
dance with the county's comprehensive plan and annual growth
policy.'3
Some of these locally initiated systems apply only to transportation
facilities, reflecting widespread public concern and discontent with
traffic congestion.14 The City of Bellevue, Washington, for example,
has a comprehensive concurrency system for transportation facilities.' 5
Enacted to implement the transportation element of the city's compre-
hensive plan, the municipal ordinance establishing the concurrency
system provides for the adoption of transportation facilities plans, in-
cluding funding mechanisms, for specific geographical areas; sets min-
imum level-of-service standards for streets; and prohibits issuance of
development permits for projects that would reduce the level of serv-
ice below those standards. 6
Other local concurrency requirements, especially some of those en-
acted by initiative and referendum in California, have been imposed
suddenly and arbitrarily without any planning basis or framework.
These expressions of citizen frustration with the problems of rapid
growth typically prohibit the issuance of permits for any development
that would reduce the level of service for transportation or other facil-
ities below established standards unless the property owner or the lo-
cal government pays for the facility improvements needed to achieve
or maintain those standards. '7 Because these citizen efforts are usually
12. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 50-35(k) (1986), reprinted in MONTGOMERY
COUNTY, MD., FY 92 AcuAL GROWTH POLCY app. 4 (1990) [hereinafter ANNuAL GROWTH
POLICY]. For discussions of the Montgomery County ordinance, see Douglas R. Porter, Montgo-
mery County's Growth Fracas, Uiu. LAND, June 1986, at 34; Philip J. Tierney, Maryland's
Growing Pains: The Need for State Regulation, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 201, 226-27 (1987).
13. See ANNUAL GRowTH POLICY, supra note 12, at 3.
14. Freilich & White, supra note 1, at 917 n.2, 941-45.
15. BELLEVUE, WASH., TRANS. CODE ch. 14.10 (1989).
16. Id. § 14.10.005A., 14.10.020, 14.10.030A.
17. See, e.g., the ordinance discussed in Scaggs, supra note 11.
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not linked to any adopted plan to pay for and provide public facili-
ties, they have received a decidedly chilly judicial reception. 8
State governments have begun to take a more active role in this
arena, not only to authorize local adequate public facilities require-
ments, but to establish guidelines for their adoption and implementa-
tion. In the Ramapo case the New York Court of Appeals held that
zoning controls that linked the timing of development to the availabi-
lity of public facilities were within the ambit of that state's traditional
zoning enabling legislation. 19 Nevertheless, following the Ramapo de-
cision, several states, to remove any doubt about this issue, amended
their zoning enabling acts to expressly authorize their local govern-
ments to impose such requirements. 20 Recently, two states-Florida
and Washington-moved beyond permissive enabling legislation and
mandated their local governments to adopt and implement concur-
rency systems pursuant to state guidelines. 21
In 1985 Florida became the first state to adopt mandatory concur-
rency legislation; it included the mandate in its landmark growth man-
agement legislation, which establishes a state, regional, and local
planning process. This legislation expresses the intent "that public
facilities and services needed to support development shall be availa-
ble concurrent with the impacts of such development." 2 To meet this
requirement, each of Florida's local governments must adopt a local
comprehensive plan containing a capital improvements element identi-
fying and providing for the public facilities needed to accommodate
projected growth and establishing minimum level-of-service (LOS)
standards for those facilities. 24 Local governments also must adopt im-
plementing land development regulations that prohibit issuance of a
18. See, e.g., infra notes 408-10 and accompanying text.
19. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 300 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
20. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 10.01 (1988) ("In order to facilitate orderly de-
velopment and growth any county and any municipality with planning and zoning authority may
enact ordinances requiring the planning, staging or provision of adequate public facilities.");
N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 674:22 (1986) (timing controls authorized where comprehensive plan
and capital improvements program prepared and where based on growth management process
balancing community development and regional needs).
21. See infra notes 26-29, 178-85, and accompanying text.
22. This legislation included the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land De-
velopment Regulation Act, chapter 163, part II, Florida Statutes, and the State Comprehensive
Plan, chapter 187, Florida Statutes. For a discussion and analysis of this legislation, see Thomas
G. Pelham, et al., Managing Florida's Growth: Toward an Integrated State, Regional, and Lo-
cal Comprehensive Planning Process, 13 FJA. ST. U. L. REv. 515 (1985).
23. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(h) (1991) (emphasis added).
24. Id. § 163.3177(3)(a).
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development permit that would result in a reduction of the LOS below
the established standards. 25
In 1990 Washington became the second state to impose the con-
currency requirement on its local governments. 26 Although the
Washington system is not as comprehensive as Florida's, it does
link the concurrency requirement to a mandatory local planning
process. The Washington legislation requires counties that exceed
specified population and growth rate thresholds, and the cities lo-
cated within those counties, to adopt and implement comprehensive
land use plans.27 To guide preparation and adoption of the local
comprehensive plans and implementing regulations, the Washing-
ton statute establishes state planning goals, including one stating
that adequate public facilities and services shall be available upon
occupancy of development without lowering service levels below
the minimum standards set by local governments. 28 However, the
Washington concurrency requirement expressly applies only to
transportation. It prohibits local development approvals that would
decrease the level of service on transportation facilities below the
standards set in the local plan "unless transportation improvements
or strategies to accommodate the impacts of development are made
concurrent with the development." 29
Other state and local governments are likely to consider
adoption of adequate public facility requirements. Several
states are engaged in planning processes30  or special
25. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
26. 1990 Wash. Legis. Serv. 1375 (West).
27. Id. § 4, at 1377-78. Only counties that have both a population of 50,000 or more and a
growth rate of more than 10% during the past 10 years, and all cities located within such coun-
ties, and counties of any size with growth rates in excess of 20% during the past 10 years, and all
cities located with such counties, must adopt local plans. However, the local legislative body of
any county with a population of less than 50,000 could remove the county and all of its cities
from the planning requirement by timely complying with certain procedures. Id. at 1377.
28. Id. § 2, at 1376. The state public facilities and services goal is as follows: "Ensure that
those public facilities and services necessary to support development shall be adequate to serve
the development at the time the development is available for occupancy and use without decreas-
ing current service levels below locally established minimum standards." Id. § 2(12), at 1376.
29. Id. § 7(6), at 1380 (emphasis added). "Concurrent with development" is defined to
"mean that improvements or strategies are in place at the time of development, or that a finan-
cial commitment is in place to complete the improvements or strategies within six years." Id.
30. See, e.g., 1989 Me. Legis. Serv. 377 (West). Maine's 1989 Comprehensive Planning and
Land Use Regulation Act requires local governments to adopt comprehensive plans, which are re-
viewed by a state agency for consistency with state statutory goals and guidelines. Id. at 381, 387.
These goals include development of an "efficient system of public facilities and services." Id. at 380.
Local government must determine the facilities needed to "support growth and development," and
adopt a capital improvements program for providing those facilities. Id. at 383, 384.
New Jersey has adopted legislation requiring the State Planning Commission to develop a
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programs3' that may culminate in the adoption of statewide concur-
rency systems. Consequently, the early experiences of states such as
Florida merit serious attention and study.
From the inception of adequate public facility and concurrency con-
trols, some land use scholars and commentators, development com-
munity representatives, and members of the judiciary have expressed a
range of concerns about the use of local capital improvement controls
to manage growth. First, they have questioned the wisdom of allowing
local governments to use such controls without significant state and
regional oversight and review.12 The fear is that such controls will pro-
mote parochialism and insularism and discourage or prevent badly
needed regional planning initiatives. Second, many critics have
charged that such controls are exclusionary in effect, if not in pur-
pose, because they artificially interfere with the natural forces of
growth, increase the cost of housing, and exclude low and moderate
income families.3 Similarly, some have contended that these controls
are a guise for no-growth policies, especially if adequate funding for
infrastructure is not available, and that local governments will use
them to halt growth simply by failing to provide the facilities and
services that are needed to support development.14 Third, developers
have complained that such controls will be used to shift to their indus-
try the costs of eliminating existing infrastructure deficits and provid-
ing facilities and services required by new development.35 Fourth,
developers have complained that these controls unduly restrict private
property rights.3 6 Finally, some have suggested that these controls will
State Development and Redevelopment Plan and an Infrastructure Needs Assessment. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-196(a) (West Supp. 1990). The state plan encourages local governments to
adopt adequate public facilities requirements, see NEw JERSEY STATE PLANNING COMM'N, I COM-
MUNmTIEs OF PLACE, A LEGACY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 28-29 (1988), but local governments
are not required to implement or act consistently with the state plan. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-
202 (West Supp. 1990).
31. For example, in 1991 California voters enacted by referendum a law that requires cities
and counties to prepare congestion management plans that prevent traffic congestion on any
major segment of the regional transportation system from falling below level of service "E."
Each local congestion management plan must be consistent with a regional mobility plan, desig-
nate the affected highway system and establish level-of-service standards, contain a program for
evaluating the impacts of land use decisions on the regional transportation system, and set up a
seven-year capital improvements program for maintaining the designated level-of-service stan-
dard. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65088-89.4 (West Supp. 1990).
32. See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
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simply perpetuate and continue existing patterns of suburban sprawl,
albeit in a phased manner and at a different pace than in the past.37
These concerns are justified and should be taken seriously. How-
ever, if an adequate public facilities or concurrency requirement is
properly conceived, designed, and implemented, these concerns can be
adequately addressed and eliminated. Like other land use controls,
these requirements should be subordinate to and consistent with a le-
gally binding comprehensive plan that comports with state and re-
gional planning goals and policies, provides for the community's
projected growth, incorporates a financially feasible capital improve-
ments program to deliver the infrastructure needed to accommodate
the projected growth, provides for an adequate supply of housing for
all income groups, discourages sprawling urban and suburban devel-
opment patterns, and allows sufficient flexibility to avoid unconstitu-
tional restrictions on private property.
Although it is not without flaws, the Florida concurrency system is
the nation's most comprehensive and innovative attempt to integrate
adequate public facilities requirements into the local comprehensive
planning process. It recognizes the need for State guidance and super-
vision for such requirements, and it addresses many of the concerns
that have been raised about the use of such controls. Using the Flor-
ida concurrency system as a vehicle for analysis, this Article discusses
and illustrates the appropriate role of adequate public facility controls
in the management of growth. First, it discusses the origins and pur-
poses of adequate public facilities requirements and the planning and
legal concerns raised by their implementation. Next, it explains and
critiques the Florida concurrency system, with particular emphasis
given to the state, regional, and local comprehensive planning frame-
work within which the concurrency requirement is implemented. The
Article then explores the major legal issues that may arise as the con-
currency requirement results in the denial of development permits. Fi-
nally, the Article concludes with some observations about the
strengths of Florida's concurrency system and some recommendations
for improving it. The author hopes that this assessment will benefit
those in other jurisdictions considering the use of adequate public fa-
cilities requirements.
III. THE ADEQUATE PUBLIC FACILITIES REQUIREMENT: ORIGINS,
PURPOSES, AND CONCERNS
The adequate public facilities or concurrency requirement is a
growth management tool for ensuring the availability of adequate
37. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
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public facilities and services to accommodate development. It seeks to
coordinate the timing of development with capital improvements plan-
ning by providing for the delivery of necessary facilities simultane-
ously with, or within a reasonable time of, the permitting or
occupation of new development. It attempts to ensure the adequacy of
the facilities and services by setting minimum performance standards
or measures for each facility or service category. The linchpin of the
requirement is a prohibition against the issuance of a development
permit unless the requisite facilities and services will be available
within the prescribed time and will be adequate as measured by the
established standards. However, the purpose of the requirement is not
to impose a moratorium on development. Rather, it seeks to avoid the
necessity for moratoria by ensuring that public facilities are available
when needed. 8
Concurrency is a fundamentally sensible but frequently controver-
sial concept. Driving the concurrency requirement is a "pay as we
grow" public policy that development should not be permitted unless
simultaneous financial commitments are also made to provide the
public facilities and services necessary to serve the development. This
policy's logic is difficult to refute. Nevertheless, concurrency evokes
considerable controversy. 9 The land development industry is likely to
protest any application of a concurrency requirement because it con-
trols the timing of development, a factor which traditionally has been
left to the private sector and the dictates of a free market economy.
The requirement also raises the specter of building moratoria because
of inadequate facilities unless developers pay to upgrade inadequate
infrastructure. Even among some strong proponents of land use con-
trols, a concurrency requirement may engender considerable suspicion
and criticism if it appears to be an exclusionary device or thinly dis-
guised no-growth scheme, neglects other equally important planning
goals such as affordable housing, or if it is imposed arbitrarily with-
out the benefit of advance study and planning and the existence of
adequate infrastructure funding systems.
Given the controversial nature of the concurrency concept, judicial
challenges to local governments' efforts to implement the requirement
are inevitable. The challengers are likely to characterize the require-
ment as an illegitimate means of halting growth and development, re-
stricting private property rights, and unfairly shifting the cost of
38. Freilich & White, supra note 1, at 941.
39. See, e.g., Robert M. Rhodes, Controversial "Concurrency" in Florida, URB. LAND,
Dec. 1988, at 32; John Koenig, The Doomsday Clause in Growth Management, FLORIDA TREND,
Oct. 1987, at 21.
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providing public facilities to the development industry.4° If the concur-
rency concept and its origins are not understood, or if the purposes of
a particular concurrency system are either not clearly articulated or
are suspect, a reviewing court may be persuaded by such characteriza-
tions. Accordingly, in designing, implementing, and evaluating con-
currency systems, it is important to understand the origins and
purposes of the adequate public facilities requirement and the con-
cerns that land use planners and commentators, affected interests, and
the courts may have about its implementation.
In jurisdictions like Florida where it has been customary to encour-
age growth and development while deferring the politically difficult
issue of paying for it, the adequate public facilities requirement may
be greeted with the same apprehension as would an invader from an-
other planet. But although it may be perceived or portrayed by some
critics as an alien regulatory species, the requirement is not a radical
departure from traditional American land development controls. Con-
cern for adequate public facilities has been manifest throughout the
evolution of our land use regulatory system, commencing with the
earliest state zoning enabling acts. Indeed, the 1926 Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act,41 on which most state zoning enabling legisla-
tion is based, expressly provided that one of the purposes of zoning
regulations is "to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation,
water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. ' 42
Consequently, local zoning board hearings customarily include con-
siderable discussion about the impact of a proposed rezoning for more
intensive use on transportation and other public facilities and services.
Judicial decisions upholding local denial of rezoning requests because
of adverse impacts on public facilities are legion.43
Public concern for the funding and delivery of infrastructure to ac-
commodate growth became increasingly evident during the develop-
ment of subdivision controls over the last several decades. Initially,
subdivision controls consisted of simple platting requirements de-
signed to make it easier to buy and sell land. 44 After rampant land
subdivision and speculation produced millions of vacant platted lots
40. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 8; Robert M. Rhodes, Concurrency: Problems, Practicali-
ties, and Prospects, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 241 (1991); see also infra notes 114-16, 159-61
and accompanying text.
41. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in MODEL LAND
DEv. CODE app. A at 210 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
42. Id.§3.
43. See generally ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.27 (3d ed. 1986).
44. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 1, at 191; CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL A.
WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING 601-02 (4th ed. 1989).
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lacking basic public facilities and services, state and local governments
expanded their subdivision regulations in the 1920s and '30s to ad-
dress infrastructure needs. 45 This movement was aided by another
model act, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, which was pub-
lished in 1928.46 Designed primarily to encourage adoption of local
comprehensive plans, the model planning act also provided for subdi-
vision controls and addressed the need to require internal subdivision
improvements, including traffic, utilities, and parks and recreation. 47
Although the states did not embrace the planning provisions of the
model planning act with the same fervor as the earlier Standard Zon-
ing Enabling Act, they nevertheless began to adopt more stringent
subdivision controls in response to mounting infrastructure prob-
lems. 48
The financial pressures of providing infrastructure intensified with
the rapid suburbanization of American cities following World War II.
As local governments struggled to provide facilities and services to
sprawling developments, they searched for ways to make new develop-
ment pay for itself. Local governments began to amend their subdivi-
sion regulations to require developers to dedicate land or make
monetary contributions to finance a wide range of subdivision im-
provements, including onsite and offsite street improvements and
park and school sites. 49 From this practice evolved impact fee systems
for requiring developers to pay a pro rata share of the cost of a range
of public facilities needed to accommodate new development.5 0 As a
result of judicial challenges, the law of subdivision exactions51 and im-
pact fees52 was developed by state courts to uphold the validity of
these requirements so long as certain conditions were met. In addi-
tion, local governments began to deny subdivision approval for pro-
jects that would have serious unmitigated impacts on public facilities
and services. The consideration of the adequacy of basic public facili-
45. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 1, at 192-93.
46. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928), reprinted in MODEL LAND DEv. CODE
app. B. at 222 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
47. Id. § 14.
48. 1 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PkNNINO LAW §§
18.01, .05, at 461, 464 (rev. ed. 1988); HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 1, at 192-93;
HAAR & WOLF, supra note 44, at 602.
49. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 1, at 192-93, 202-04.
50. Id. at 276-80.
51. See generally HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 1, at 202-12; Fred P. Bosselman
& Nancy E. Stroud, Pariah to Paragon: Developer Exactions in Florida 1975-85, 14 STETSON L.
REv. 527 (1985).
52. See generally HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 1, at 276-87. In Florida, the semi-
nal case on impact fees is Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla.
1976).
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ties and services is now commonplace in the regulatory process for
subdivision approval,53 and impact fees have become an increasingly
popular method of paying for those facilities.5 4
Another significant phase in the evolution of both American land
use controls generally and capital improvements controls specifically
began in the 1950s and '60s. Historically, the adoption of a separate
comprehensive plan was not a legal prerequisite to the exercise of zon-
ing and other land use regulations. 55 However, many land use planners
and commentators long advocated such a requirement. An early and
leading proponent of this requirement was Harvard Law School Pro-
fessor Charles Haar, who advocated, in his influential and widely
cited 1955 article, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,"5 6
that state enabling acts should require that zoning be in accordance
with a separately adopted master plan. 57 Inspired by such advocacy, a
number of states in the 1960s and '70s enacted legislation requiring
that local land use regulations be consistent with a separately prepared
and adopted comprehensive plan.58 The local comprehensive plan was
to become the vehicle for integrating capital improvements planning
with land use planning.
In the 1960s and '70s a few local governments also began develop-
ing timing and sequential development controls. By linking zoning
and subdivision regulations with the capital improvements elements of
local comprehensive plans, these controls sought to coordinate the
granting of new development approvals with the planned provision of
adequate public facilities.5 9 The adoption of these controls was in-
spired by urban planner Henry Fagin and land use lawyer and profes-
sor Robert Freilich. In his influential article, Regulating the Timing of
Urban Development,6° published in 1955, Fagin advocated public con-
trol of the timing and sequence of development. According to Fagin,
such planning controls were needed to ensure that a high standard of
public services and facilities were provided in the most economical
fashion, to retain public control over the character of development,
53. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 1, at 193.
54. Id. at 206, 276-87; Julian C. Juergensmeyer & Robert M. Blake, Impact Fees: An An-
swer to Local Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 415 (1981).
55. THOMAS G. PELHAM, STATE LAND-USE PLANNING AND REGULATION 146-47 (1979).
56. Charles M. Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan", 68 HARV. L. REV.
1154 (1955).
57. Id. at 1157, 1174.
58. PELHAM, supra note 55, at 147-48.
59. HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 1, at 259-62.
60. Henry Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 298 (1955). Henry Fagin was apparently the first advocate of development timing con-
trols.
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and to achieve the desired balance among various land uses. 61 He sug-
gested that these goals could be achieved through the designation of
building priority zones and control over the issuance of building per-
mits.6 2
Building on Fagin's ideas and suggestions, Ramapo, New York, in
1969 adopted an ordinance conditioning residential subdivision ap-
proval on the availability of adequate municipal facilities, which were
to be provided in phases over an eighteen-year period in accordance
with the town's adopted comprehensive plan and capital improve-
ments program.63 The ordinance was drafted and defended in court by
Professor Robert Freilich, who was to become the leading proponent
of timing and sequential development controls.6 The judicial valida-
tion of the Ramapo system in Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo6"
in 1972 and the continuing advocacy of Professor Freilich gave impe-
tus to the spread of such systems around the country.66
In Florida, variations of timed or phased development controls and
antecedents of the new concurrency requirement can be found in the
state's special review process for large-scale projects designated as de-
velopments of regional impact (DRIs). 67 Established in 1972, this
61. Id. at 300-02.
62. Id. at 302-03.
63. See infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
64. Freilich & White, supra note 1, at 927 n.60 (discussing Professor Freilich's other writ-
ings and activities).
65. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
66. Douglas R. Porter, Do State Growth Management Acts Make a Difference? Local
Growth Management Measures Under Different State Growth Policies, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1015, 1020 n.20 (1991). The author describes Professor Freilich's contribution as follows:
Both San Diego's and Sarasota's programs have been heavily influenced by the fertile
imagination of Robert Freilich, a well-known land use attorney who has specialized
over the past 20 or so years in fostering the explosive growth of his brand of growth
management.... [A] noted author, lecturer, and consultant, he has left a paper trail
of growth management proposals across the United States that would please an ar-
chaeologist wishing to trace the evolution of growth management.
Id.
Professor Freilich has written extensively about the use of timing and sequential development
controls. See, e.g., Freilich & White, supra note 1; Robert Freilich & David T. Greis, Timing and
Sequencing Development: Controlling Growth, in FuTURE LAND USE 59 (Robert W. Burchell &
David Listokin eds., 1975); Robert H. Freilich & John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Timing and Sequential
Controls-The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Direc-
tions for Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REV.
1009 (1974). Robert H. Freilich, Development Timing, Moratoria, and Controlling Growth,
1974 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DoMAIN 147.
67. FLA. STAT. § 380.06 (1991). A "development of regional impact" is defined as "any
development which, because of its character, magnitude, or location, would have a substantial
effect upon the health, safety, or welfare of citizens of more than one county." Id. § 380.06(1).
The Florida Legislature has established statewide guidelines and standards for determining
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process requires regional planning agencies and local governments to
consider whether proposed developments of regional impact "will ef-
ficiently use or unduly burden water, sewer, solid waste disposal, or
other necessary public facilities" including public transportation facil-
ities.s Local development orders approving DRIs are frequently con-
ditioned on the availability of adequate public facilities and may
contain timing or phasing provisions to ensure that development of
each phase cannot commence until the availability of adequate facili-
ties or services is assured.69
The various national movements toward the integration of capital
improvements planning and programming with land use planning and
regulation coalesced in Florida in 1985 with the enactment of the
state's comprehensive growth management legislation.70 This legisla-
tion incorporates all of the features necessary to coordinate land de-
velopment with the provision of infrastructure and services. 7' It
mandates the adoption of legally binding local comprehensive plans
containing capital improvements elements that outline when, where,
and how public facilities and services will be provided.7 2 It requires
that all local government actions concerning development, including
all land development regulations and development orders, be consis-
tent with the adopted plan. 73 It controls the timing and phasing of
development by prohibiting development approvals unless adequate
public facilities are available concurrent with the impacts of develop-
ment and in accordance with the capital improvements element of the
local plan. 74 Finally, the Florida legislation synthesizes all of these
components into a coherent and comprehensive system for managing
the state's growth. 75
Placed in historical context, the Florida concurrency requirement is
a logical outgrowth of the zoning, subdivision, and planning controls
that have evolved over the last five or six decades. It is a growth man-
whether particular developments must undergo the regional review process. Id. §§ 380.06(2)(a),
.0651. For a discussion of this process, see Thomas G. Pelham, Regulating Developments of
Regional Impact: Florida and the Model Code, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 789 (1977).
68. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(12)(a)3.-4. (1991).
69. Interview with Tom Beck, Chief, Bureau of State Planning, Fla. Dep't of Comm'y Aff.
(Jan. 6, 1992) (notes available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). The
Department of Community Affairs administers the Florida Development of Regional Impact
program.
70. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
71. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3167(2), .3194 (1991).
72. Id. § 163.3177(3)(a).
73. Id. § 163.3194.
74. Id. § 163.3177(10)(h); see also infra notes 235, 266, and accompanying text.
75. See Pelham et al., supra note 22, at 521, 590.
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agement tool that builds upon earlier efforts to ensure the availability
of adequate public facilities to accommodate new development. Con-
ceptually, the concurrency requirement is a neutral growth manage-
ment tool; it neither encourages nor discourages growth, but it simply
commands that development be accompanied by the provision of ade-
quate public facilities. But like other land use controls, concurrency
can be designed or manipulated to achieve a variety of purposes, some
laudable and some suspect. Thus, while the concurrency requirement
itself is not revolutionary, it is important to understand the purposes
for which it is being imposed and the concerns that it engenders.
As noted earlier, Ramapo76 is the seminal decision establishing the
legality of adequate public facilities requirements. 77 In Ramapo the
New York Court of Appeals reviewed the first comprehensive system
for coordinating the timing and phasing of development with the pro-
vision of public facilities, discussed a number of concerns raised about
the purposes and effects of such systems, and rejected statutory and
constitutional attacks on the Ramapo system. Therefore, it is worth-
while to revisit in detail both the Ramapo approach and the rationale
of the court's decision.
The Ramapo system was built on a comprehensive planning foun-
dation. Following a study of the community's existing land uses, pub-
lic facilities, economic base, housing needs, and projected growth, the
Town adopted a master plan.78 To implement the master plan, it also
adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance and both a short-term and
a long-term capital improvements program. The short-term program
consisted of a capital budget providing for the development of facili-
ties identified in the master plan during the initial six-year period.19
The long-term capital improvements program provided for the loca-
tion and timing of the development of facilities specified in the master
plan during the subsequent twelve-year period.80 Collectively, the two
plans specified the capital improvements needed for maximum devel-
opment of the town over an eighteen-year period consistent with the
adopted master plan.81
76. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
77. Based on a comprehensive survey of land use practitioners and commentators, the Ra-
mapo decision was once ranked as the most significant land use regulation case other than Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Michael D. Dozjer & Donald G.
Hagman, Ranking Land Development and Environmental Cases and Courts, EvrL. COmmzNT,
Aug. 1978, at 4, 4.
78. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 294.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 294-95.
81. Id. at 295.
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In order to coordinate residential development with the Town's
ability to provide public facilities under its adopted capital improve-
ments programs, the Town amended its subdivision ordinance to pro-
hibit residential subdivision approval in the unincorporated areas of
the town unless the developer first secured a special permit. 2 Issuance
of a special permit was made contingent on the availability of five
public facilities or services: sanitary sewer; drainage; parks or recrea-
tion, including public schools; roads; and firehouses. 3 The availability
of the facilities and services was measured by a point system based on
a sliding scale of values assigned to the specific facilities.8 No permit
would be issued unless fifteen points were accumulated, but a devel-
oper was permitted to earn points and accelerate the date of subdivi-
sion approval by providing the facilities." At least one single-family
residential dwelling was permitted on each tract of land, and provi-
sions for vested rights, variances, and reduced property tax assess-
ments were included to avoid unreasonable restrictions.86 As described
by the court, the system provided "an over-all program of orderly
growth and adequate facilities through a sequential development pol-
icy commensurate with progressing availability and capacity of public
facilities.''87
Individual local landowners who had been denied subdivision ap-
proval and the county builders association contended that the Town
was not authorized to adopt the amendments to its subdivision ordi-
nance and also challenged both the purposes and the alleged effects of
the amendments. 8 First, they alleged that the regulation of population
growth through timing and phasing controls was not authorized by
the state's zoning enabling act. 9 Second, they contended that the Ra-
mapo scheme did not advance legitimate zoning purposes. 9° Third,
they argued that the ordinance, by restricting development for up to
eighteen years, diminished the value of property to such an extent that
it prevented any profitable or beneficial use of the landowners' prop-
erty. Accordingly, the alleged effect of the ordinance was so confisca-
tory as to constitute a deprivation of property without due process of
law and a taking of property without just compensation. 91
82. Id. at 295 n.2.
83. Id. at 295.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 295-96.
86. Id. at 296.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 294.
89. Id. at 298.
90. Id. at 296.
91. Id. at 294, 303.
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The court rejected the ultra vires argument based on its interpreta-
tion of the New York zoning enabling act and its understanding of the
purposes of the Ramapo ordinance. Like the Standard Zoning Ena-
bling Act on which it was based, the New York enabling act did not
specifically authorize "timing" and "sequential" development con-
trols.9 2 But like its progenitor, the New York Act expressly authorized
municipalities to enact zoning ordinances for the purpose of control-
ling population density and "to facilitate the adequate provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public re-
quirements." 93 The court held that this express grant of power in-
cluded, by necessary implication, the authority to control the timing
and phasing of development to assure the availability of adequate
public facilities 4
Similarly, the court easily disposed of the attacks on the system's
purposes. As land use regulations restricting the use of private prop-
erty, the Ramapo ordinances were subject to the deferential standard
of review enunciated in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.95 In
Euclid the Supreme Court ruled that land use regulations would not
violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses unless they "are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.'"'9 Under this
standard, the regulation must have a legitimate public purpose, and
the regulation must be a reasonable means to achieve that purpose.97
In applying this standard, courts have traditionally shown great defer-
ence to the regulation under review;9" if its validity is "fairly debata-
ble, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." 99
Applying this standard of review, the New York court identified at
least five "legitimate zoning purposes" '1 of the Ramapo system.
92. Id. at 296.
93. Id. at 297 n.3, 307. As the dissenting judge in the Ramapo case pointed out: "The
enabling acts for the several classes of municipalities in the State are substantially alike. They
followed the model acts drafted by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the 1920's . . . ." Id.
at 306-07.
94. Id. at 297, 300. The Ramapo majority concluded that there was a correlation between
the regulation of "population density" and the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements, both of which were expressly mentioned
in the New York zoning enabling legislation. Id. at 296 n.3. The majority also characterized the
Ramapo system's provisions to ensure adequate facilities as "forms of density controls." Id.
95. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
96. Id. at 395.
97. Jerold Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in
the Nollan Invitation (Part I), 23 UiR. LAW. 301, 302-309 (1991).
98. Id. at 308-09.
99. 272 U.S. at 388 (citation omitted).
100. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 297.
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First, it eliminated "premature subdivision and urban sprawl."'' ° Sec-
ond, it assured a minimum level of public facilities and services for
each new home.'0 2 Third, it sought "to provide a balanced cohesive
community dedicated to the efficient utilization of land."' 03 Fourth, it
prevented premature subdivision without necessary public facilities by
ensuring "continuous development commensurate with the Town's
obligation to provide such facilities."'1 04 Fifth, it prevented the urban
blight that results when adequate public facilities and services are not
provided. 05 According the Ramapo scheme the traditional "presump-
tion of validity' °6 and refusing "to substitute its judgment as to the
plan's over-all effectiveness" for that of the local legislature, 0 7 the
court easily concluded that Ramapo's system of timing and sequential
development controls was a reasonable means of achieving its legiti-
mate public purposes °m
The court almost summarily rejected the contention that the Ra-
mapo system constituted an unlawful taking of the plaintiffs' prop-
erty. After citing its own prior ruling that a regulation which
101. Id. at 295.
102. Id. at 301. In citing this reason, the court noted Ramapo's contention that "for want of
time and money" it was unable to provide these facilities and services concurrent with the pres-
ent rate of home construction. Id.
103. Id. at 302.
104. Id.
105. Id.
In sum, Ramapo asks not that it be left alone, but only that it be allowed to prevent
the kind of deterioration that has transformed well-ordered and thriving residential
communities into blighted ghettos with attendant hazards to health, security and social
stability-a danger not without substantial basis in fact.
Id.
106. Id. at 301. "[W]e have afforded such regulations, the usual presumption of validity
attending the exercise of the police power, and have cast the burden of proving their invalidity
upon the party challenging their enactment." Id. (citations omitted).
107. Id. "Implicit in such a philosophy of judicial self-restraint is the growing awareness that
matters of land use and development are peculiarly within the expertise of students of city and
suburban planning, and thus well within the legislative prerogative, not lightly to be impeded."
Id. (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 303. The court stated:
Considered as a whole, it represents both in its inception and implementation a rea-
sonable attempt to provide for the sequential, orderly development of land in con-
junction with the needs of the community, as well as individual parcels of land, while
simultaneously obviating the blighted aftermath which the initial failure to provide
needed facilities so often brings.
Id. However, the court then seemed to qualify its conclusion that there was a reasonable rela-
tionship between the purposes and means of the Ramapo system with the following statement:
"In sum, where it is clear that the existing physical and financial resources of the
community are inadequate to furnish the essential services and facilities which a sub-
stantial increase in population requires, there is a rational basis for 'phased
growth' .... .
Id. at 304-05.
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permanently precludes all reasonable use of property is a taking,' 9 the
court concluded that the Ramapo restrictions, while "substantial in
nature and duration,"""0 were only "temporary," even if they re-
mained in effect for the eighteen-year life of the program.'' Moreo-
ver, based on the assumption that the Town would fully and timely
implement its capital improvements program, and noting the various
savings provisions in the Ramapo system, the court observed that
landowners would be able to make reasonable use of their property
within the fixed eighteen-year period." 2 Accordingly, the court held
that the ordinance did not violate either the federal or state constitu-
tions." 3
Despite the New York court's validation of the Ramapo plan, many
land use lawyers, planners, and commentators have expressed a vari-
ety of concerns about inappropriate purposes and undesirable effects
of such systems. These concerns range from local parochialism in the
management of growth, to exclusionary zoning, to the perpetuation of
sprawling development patterns. The plaintiffs raised some of these
concerns before the Ramapo court. Although the court addressed
these concerns with varying degrees of interest, the court found none
of them sufficiently compelling to warrant invalidation of the Ra-
mapo plan.
Perhaps the most forceful criticism of the Ramapo plan and its
progeny is that they are vehicles for exclusion. Left to their own de-
vices, local governments have engaged in various exclusionary
schemes."14 Some have sought to exclude population generally through
limited or no-growth schemes."15 Others have attempted to exclude
discrete segments of the population such as racial or minority groups
or particular uses such as low-income housing."16 Still others have en-
109. Id. at 303. The case cited by the Ramapo court was Arverne Bay Construction Co. v.
Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1938), which declared a land use restriction to be an unconstitu-
tional taking because it appeared to be a permanent restriction with no inference "that within a
reasonable time the property can be put to a profitable use or that the present inconvenience or
hardship imposed upon the plaintiff is temporary." 15 N.E.2d at 592.
110. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 304.
111. Id. at 303.
112. Id. at 304.
113. Id. at304-05.
114. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
115. For a case involving such a scheme, see City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371
So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
824 (1980), in which the court invalidated a population cap that the City sought to achieve by
limiting the number of dwelling units that would be permitted in the jurisdiction. The court held
that the cap was arbitrary and unreasonable because it was not based on a comprehensive plan.
Id. at 159.
116. For examples of exclusionary practices of this type, see the famous New Jersey cases,
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gaged in fiscal zoning practices to maximize the local tax base through
the promotion of commercial and industrial uses and the exclusion of
residential uses that do not pay for themselves." 7 Critics of the Ra-
mapo plan have suggested that it contained all of these elements. They
have noted that it afforded little opportunity for low-income hous-
ing," 8 included virtually no multifamily development," 9 was based on
large-lot residential zoning that limited population growth,2 0 and did
not apply to commercial and other nonresidential development.' 2' In
commenting on the Ramapo plan and its judicial validation, Fred
Bosselman, a nationally prominent land use lawyer, pointedly noted:
"The wolf of exclusionary zoning hides under the environmental
sheepskin worn by the stop-growth movement." 2
Ostensibly, the Ramapo majority did not take lightly the contention
that the municipality's plan cloaked exclusionary purposes. Quoting
from a famous Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning case, the court
stated: "[Z]oning is a means by which a government body can plan
for the future-it may not be used as a means to deny the future.' '123
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), ap-
peal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (invalidating a local zoning ordinance be-
cause it excluded low- and moderate- income families and providing that each local government
must provide its fair share of regional housing needs), and Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983), on remand, 504 A.2d 66 (N.J. Super.
1984) (holding that local governments must take affirmative inclusionary actions such as incen-
tive zoning, density bonuses, and mandatory low-income housing set-asides to meet their fair
share obligations).
117. In holding that a municipality could not exclude low-income housing for fiscal reasons,
the New Jersey Supreme Court characterized the City's fiscal zoning argument as follows:
[t]he position is that any municipality may zone extensively to seek and encourage the
"good" tax ratables of industry and commerce and limit the permissible types of
housing to those having the fewest school children or to those providing sufficient
value to attain or approach paying their own way taxwise.
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 731 (N.J.),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
118. See, e.g., Fred P. Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights
of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 234, 249-50 (1973); Herbert M. Franklin, Control-
ling Urban Growth: But For Whom?, in 2 MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 78, 84-85
(Randall W. Scott et al. eds., 1975).
119. See, e.g., David W. Silverman, A Return to the Walled Cities: Ramapo as an Imperium
in Imperio, in MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH, supra note 118, at 52; Bosselman, supra
note 118, at 245.
120. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 118, at 91-92.
121. Herbert M. Franklin, Legal Dimensions to Controlling Urban Growth, in MANAGEMENT
& CONTROL OF GROWTH, supra note 118, at 216, 234 ("In summary, the main criticism of Ra-
mapo is that it is fiscal zoning dressed in environmental clothing."); see also Silverman, supra
note 119, at 55; Franklin, supra note 118, at 93.
122. Bosselman, supra note 118, at 249.
123. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 301 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972) (quoting National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (Pa. 1965),
which invalidated a four-acre minimum lot size requirement as exclusionary).
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Accordingly, the court warned that it would not tolerate any local ex-
clusionary efforts to avoid the burdens of growth and that communi-
ties must "confront the challenge of population growth with open
doors."124 However, impressed by the Town's comprehensive plan-
ning efforts, its commitments to provide public facilities, and its pro-
vision for low-income housing, the court concluded that the Ramapo
plan was an attempt "to maximize growth by the efficient use of
land" and therefore assimilated rather than excluded population.'5
Because of its highly deferential posture, the court did not closely
scrutinize the Ramapo plan's particulars, which were inconsistent with
either the maximization of growth or the efficient use of land.' 26
Consider the sharply contrasting reaction of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court to the exclusionary issue in a series of cases dealing with
large-lot residential zoning. In National Land & Investment Co. v.
Kohn, 27 which ironically was cited and quoted by the Ramapo
court,' 28 the Pennsylvania court declared unconstitutional the town-
ship's four-acre minimum residential lot size zoning restriction. 29 Al-
though it purported to apply Euclid's deferential due process-equal
protection standard of review, 30 the court in fact subjected the alleged
purposes of the four-acre lot requirement to strict scrutiny. Closely
examining and rejecting each of the purposes advanced by the Town-
ship, including such traditional zoning objectives as ensuring adequate
sewage disposal and protecting water supplies, 3 ' the court concluded
that the requirement had an exclusionary purpose and design and was
therefore invalid.3 2 In a subsequent case, using the same analytical
approach, the Pennsylvania court invalidated two- and three-acre
minimum residential lot sizes as exclusionary. 3 1 Was it perhaps signif-
icant that unlike Ramapo the Pennsylvania towns had not adopted a
comprehensive plan?3 4
124. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 302.
125. Id.
126. See Bosselman, supra note 118, at 245-46.
127. 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965).
128. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 301 (quoting NationalLand, 215 A.2d at 610).
129. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 613 (Pa. 1965).
130. Id. at 607.
131. Id. at 608.
132. Id. at 610-11.
133. In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970). Reaffirming National Land, the
court stated: "we once again reaffirm our past authority and refuse to allow the township to do
precisely what we have never permitted-keep out people, rather than make community im-
provements." Id. at 768.
134. In National Land the court stated:
A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in
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A second major concern relates to the perceived need for a broader
geographic perspective in land use planning. The propensity of local
governments to pursue their own parochial and selfish interests at the
expense of their neighbors and region has been widely noted and criti-
cized.'35 Some critics have contended that Ramapo-type controls
would further encourage those tendencies and that local governments
should not be allowed to impose them without state supervision or a
requirement that it be in accordance with state and regional planning
goals and policies. 3 6 Similarly, the dissenting judge in Ramapo opined
that the municipality's plan reflected "a parochial stance without re-
gard to its impact on the region or the State."' 37 Noting the ongoing
reform efforts and projects of the American Law Institute and the
New York Office of Planning Coordination, he contended that the
problems of uncontrolled urban sprawl require "solution at a regional
or State level.' The Ramapo majority also recognized the broader
geographical dimensions of urban problems, the failure of local gov-
ernments to effectively address and solve those problems, and the
need for a regional or statewide planning process. Nevertheless, accu-
rately observing that "the power to zone under current law is vested in
local municipalities, and we are constrained to resolve the issues ac-
cordingly," the majority declined to invalidate the Ramapo ordinance
"in the wistful hope" that the various reform movements "will soon
bear fruit."1' 9 Based upon its construction of the New York zoning
enabling act, the court held that the Town was empowered to adopt
the Ramapo plan, which it characterized as "a first practical step to-
ward controlled growth achieved without forsaking broader social
purposes."'' 4
order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of
public services and facilities can not be held valid. Of course, we do not mean to imply
that a governmental body may not utilize its zoning power in order to insure that the
municipal services which the community requires are provided in an orderly and ra-
tional manner.
National Land, 215 A.2d at 612.
135. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLrES, Ti QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL (1972). The authors characterized the local land use regulatory system as "thousands
of individual local governments, each seeking to maximize its tax base and minimize its social
problems, and caring less what happens to all the others." Id. at 1.
136. See, e.g., Bosselman, supra note 118, at 265; Randall Scott, Comment, in MANAGEMENT
& CONTROL OF GROWTH, supra note 118, at 41, 49.
137. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 305.
138. Id. at 306. The dissenting opinion specifically cited the ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CODE, on which the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, chapter
380, Florida Statutes, was based. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 306. See Pelham, supra note 67, at
792-93.
139. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 299-300.
140. Id. at 301.
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The New York court's treatment of the regional issue in Ramapo
should be compared to the approach taken by the California court in
Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay v. City of Livermore. 4'
Through the initiative process, voters in the City of Livermore enacted
an adequate public facilities ordinance prohibiting issuance of residen-
tial building permits until educational, wastewater, and water supply
facilities complied with specified standards. 142 Among the challenges
brought by members of the construction industry was a claim that the
ordinance unconstitutionally barred immigration to Livermore and
therefore impacted not only the welfare of the city but also of the
surrounding region.143 In response, the court ruled that such land use
ordinances "are constitutional if they are reasonably related to the
welfare of the region affected by the ordinance,"' 44 established a
three-step analysis for making this regional welfare determination,
then remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the
Livermore ordinance complied with the regional welfare standard. 45
One can only speculate as to why the California and New York courts
responded so differently to the regional concern. Perhaps a reason is
that the Ramapo ordinance was the product of a comprehensive plan-
ning process, while the Livermore ordinance was imposed suddenly
and arbitrarily by citizen initiative. 4
Another criticism of the Ramapo plan was that it promoted and
programmed urban sprawl. '47 This criticism is ironic because the Ra-
mapo system was adopted "for the alleged purpose of eliminating pre-
mature subdivision and urban sprawl. ' ' 141 But as some critics have
pointed out, while the system discouraged the "leapfrog" variety of
sprawl by requiring sequential development patterns, it perpetuated
the continuing spread of low-density residential sprawl because it
failed to alter the underlying spatial pattern of large-lot, single-family
141. 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976).
142. Id. at 475.
143. Id. at 483-87.
144. Id. at 476.
145. Id. at 488-90.
146. See Thomas C. O'Keefe, Time Controls on Land Use: Prophylactic Law for Planners,
in MANAGEMENT & CoNrROL or GRowTH, supra note 118, at 68, in which the author states:
An initial significant distinction between time controls and other zoning devices that
have been voided on exclusionary grounds is that when the time control device is
linked with a bona fide comprehensive plan and a formula for gradually including
low- and moderate-income housing, the whole scheme takes on an equitable, quasi-
regional, and judicially palatable character.
(Citation omitted.)
147. See, e.g., Bosselman, supra note 118, at 248.
148. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 295.
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zoning. 49 Therefore, according to one commentator, the Ramapo
plan "merely proposes a better organized and phased pattern of sub-
urban sprawl."' 50 Given the traditional presumption of validity that it
afforded the Ramapo ordinance, the court was not inclined to second-
guess the overall effectiveness of the Ramapo system and appeared to
accept at face value the Town's contention that the purpose of the
plan was to control urban sprawl' 5 Nevertheless, given the Ramapo
plan's almost total embrace of low-density residential zoning, 5 2 the
criticism that the plan promoted urban sprawl is a valid one.
Perhaps the most fundamental question raised about Ramapo-type
plans is the nature of the local government's obligation to provide the
requisite facilities 5  If development permission is contingent upon the
availability of public facilities, the local government can effectively
stop growth simply by failing to provide the necessary infrastructure.
For this reason, Henry Fagin, who is credited with originating the
concept of development timing, proposed that local governments be
required to provide services in order to enforce the concept. 1 4 The
Ramapo court repeatedly refers to the Town's "obligation" to pro-
vide the facilities and its "commitment" in its adopted comprehensive
plan to the construction of capital improvements.'5 5 Impliedly, the
court recognized a legal obligation on the part of the Town to provide
the facilities necessary to gain development approval under the Ra-
mapo system. The court also acknowledged the potential impact on
the landowner or developer if the Town defaulted in its obligation or
commitment. However, the court noted that in resolving a challenge
to the facial validity of the Ramapo ordinance, it "must assume not
only the Town's good faith, but its assiduous adherence to the pro-
gram's scheduled implementation.' ' 56 In the event the Town later de-
faulted in its obligation to provide the facilities, the court observed
that an aggrieved landowner could bring an action to declare the ordi-
nance unconstitutional as applied to his property or to have the res-
trictions removed from the property.5 7 The court did not mention the
possibility of an action to compel the Town to provide the facilities or
149. Franklin, supra note 118, at 92; Bosselman, supra note 118, at 248-50.
150. Richard May, Comment, in MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH, supra note 118, at
49, 50.
151. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 301.
152. Id. at 295 n.2.
153. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 8, at 36.
154. Fagin, supra note 60, at 303.
155. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 198-99 n.7, 302, 304.
156. Id. at 299 n.7.
157. Id.
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whether an action for damages would be available because of the
Town's breach of its obligation.
The issue of local government's obligation takes on added signifi-
cance when one considers Ramapo's rather dismal performance in im-
plementing its six-year capital improvements program. Following the
adoption of the Ramapo plan in 1969, the Town deferred major por-
tions of its 1971 capital budget, did not even adopt capital budgets for
1972 and 1973, and significantly altered its 1974 budget. Perhaps not
coincidentally, the number of dwelling units approved during each of
the first five years of the plan was almost fifty percent less than the
annual rate before adoption of the plan.'58 In view of this record, per-
haps a court reviewing a Ramapo-type plan should carefully scrutinize
and analyze the financial feasibility of the local capital improvements
program rather than assume a local government's good faith, as did
the Ramapo court?
Closely related to the issue of the local government's obligation is
the criticism that such controls can unfairly shift the burden of pro-
viding public facilities from the local government to the landowner. 59
If a local government fails to provide the facilities necessary to obtain
development approval, the developer or landowner may be forced to
finance or provide the facilities, assuming this is an economically fea-
sible option. Indeed, the Ramapo plan provided that developers could
advance the date of subdivision approval for their property by provid-
ing the necessary facilities. However, the Ramapo court did not allude
to any legal or equitable problem with this provision and in fact cited
it as one of the safeguards in the Ramapo plan. 160 Perhaps the chal-
lengers did not raise this issue. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored,
especially when adequate facility requirements are imposed not only in
largely undeveloped areas, as in the environs of Ramapo, but also in
areas with some existing development, as in much of Florida. In these
situations, to meet the requirement for adequate public facilities, a
landowner might be asked not only to provide the facilities needed by
its own project, but also to remedy existing infrastructure deficiencies.
In this circumstance, the burden transferred to the developer increases
significantly and therefore magnifies the legal and equitable dimen-
sions of the problem.
Finally, the concern raised most frequently by the development
community is that Ramapo-type systems unlawfully restrict private
property rights. Not surprisingly, this was a major contention of the
158. HAAR & WOLF, supra note 44, at 580-81.
159. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 121, at 230-31.
160. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
CONCURRENCY
plaintiffs in the Ramapo case. 161 Although the New York Court of
Appeals rejected these contentions and the United States Supreme
Court denied review of Ramapo, the decision hardly presents an in-
surmountable barrier for takings claims against other adequate public
facilities requirements. First, the resolution of takings claims turns on
the facts of each case; courts decide takings cases by "engaging in
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.' 6 2 Under this mode of analysis,
the unique features, purposes, and effects of each adequate public fa-
cilities requirement will be determinative. Second, the Ramapo plain-
tiffs brought a facial challenge against the ordinance but presented no
evidence of any diminution in the value of their land,6 3 a critical ele-
ment of every takings case. Third, and perhaps most important, there
have been two important developments in takings jurisprudence since
the Ramapo decision in 1972 that may affect implementation of ade-
quate public facilities requirements. In 1987 the Supreme Court recog-
nized the concept of compensable temporary regulatory takings in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles'" and called for heightened judicial scrutiny of the rationales
of land use regulations restricting private property in Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission. 6 5 These decisions are frequently cited as
potential barriers to the implementation of Florida's concurrency sys-
tem and will be discussed in Part IV.
Numerous commentators have criticized the Ramapo decision for
being too deferential in its review of the Ramapo system. Undoubt-
edly, the traditional presumption of validity and low level of scrutiny
afforded the Ramapo ordinance by the court'16 obscured legitimate
concerns about its purposes and effects. But there is more to this story
than excessive judicial restraint. The court was demonstrably im-
pressed by the Town's planning efforts. After describing in detail the
Town's planning activities, including its adopted master plan and cap-
ital improvements programs, 6 7 the court repeatedly used these activi-
161. 285 N.E.2d at 294.
162. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
163. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 303. The test for a taking claim based on a facial challenge
to a regulation, i.e., an allegation that the mere enactment of the regulation constitutes a taking,
is more demanding than a taking claim based on the particular impact of the regulation as ap-
plied to specific property. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493-95, 501. In a facial attack, the challenger
must show that the regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land . . . ." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485 (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
164. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
165. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
166. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
167. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95.
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ties to buttress its disposition of the various issues. For example, the
implementing subdivision controls "are the product of foresighted
planning calculated to promote the welfare of the township,"'" and
they "conform to the community's considered land use policies as ex-
pressed in its comprehensive plan.' ' 69 In rejecting concerns about the
substantial nature and duration of the restrictions that might operate
for as long as eighteen years, the court cited the Town's planning
commitment to construct capital improvements and assumed that
"the Town will put its best effort forward in implementing the physi-
cal and fiscal timetable outlined under the plan."1 70 As for concerns
that the Ramapo controls would be misused, the court stated that
"the preeminent protection against their abuse resides in the manda-
tory on-going planning and development requirement, present here,
which attends their implementation and use.' ' 7' The obvious moral of
the Ramapo story is that a comprehensive plan will alleviate many
judicial concerns.
In sum, the Ramapo decision teaches that a comprehensive plan-
ning foundation is important to the design, implementation, and judi-
cial validation of regulatory systems that use adequate public facilities
requirements to manage growth. It is also instructive on the point that
a plan may mask improper purposes and effects if it is not truly com-
prehensive in scope and detail. As the following section illustrates,
Florida has learned these lessons well and, as a result, has improved
immeasurably on the Ramapo model.
IV. THE FLORIDA CONCURRENCY SYSTEM
The "wistful hope" of the Ramapo majority for state and regional
intervention in the planning arena has become a reality in Florida.
During the last twenty years, Florida has emerged as the nation's
leader in reforming its land use planning and regulatory system
through innovative state, regional, and local planning legislation. In
1972 it became the first state to adopt legislation based on article
seven of the American Law Institute's proposed MODEL LAND DEVEL-
OPMENT CODE,172 one of the reform efforts cited in Ramapo.73 The
Florida Land and Water Management Act of 1972 74 created special
168. Id. at 303.
169. Id. at 302.
170. Id. at 304.
171. Id. at 303.
172. PELutM, supra note 55, at 5.
173. Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d at 299.
174. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1991).
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processes for regulating Developments of Regional Impact and Areas
of Critical State Concern. 75 Subsequently, the Legislature enacted the
nation's strongest mandatory local planning legislation, the Local
Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975.176 This Act re-
quired each of the state's local governments to adopt a comprehensive
plan by 1979 in accordance with statutory criteria.' 77
Florida established a state and regional planning process and
strengthened its local planning legislation in the 1980s. The Florida
State and Regional Planning Act of 1984178 required preparation of
the State Comprehensive Plan and established procedures for its
adoption. 79 It also required each of the state's eleven regional plan-
ning agencies to adopt a comprehensive regional policy plan that is
consistent with the state plan. 80 The Florida Legislature in 1985
adopted the State Comprehensive Plan, 8' and the Local Government
Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act
(1985 Act), 8 2 which strengthened considerably the state's local plan-
ning legislation and mandated the consistency of local plans with the
state and regional plans.'83 The cumulative effect of these various laws
was the creation of a statutory framework for an integrated state, re-
gional, and local comprehensive planning process. 84
Florida's concurrency system is implemented within and as an inte-
gral part of this comprehensive planning process. Because the concur-
rency requirement intrudes sharply, visibly, and controversially into
the land use regulatory process by threatening the denial of develop-
ment permits, it tends to overshadow other important components of
the larger planning system of which it is a part. In evaluating Florida's
concurrency system, however, it is essential to understand and con-
sider the underlying state, regional, and local planning system that
supports it. Like its Ramapo precursor, the Florida concurrency sys-
175. Id. §§ 380.05-.06. For discussion of these two processes, see PELHAM, supra note 55, ch.
3&5.
176. Ch. 75-257, 1975 Fla. Laws 794 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1977)).
177. For a discussion of the Act and its various requirements, see PELHtAM, supra note 55, at
169-90.
178. Ch. 84-257, 1984 Fla. Laws 1166 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 186.001-.911 (Supp. 1984)).
For a discussion of the Act, see Robert M. Rhodes & Robert C. Apgar, Charting Florida's
Course: The State and Regional Planning Act of 1984, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 583 (1984).
179. FLA. STAT. §§ 186.007-.008 (Supp. 1984).
180. Id. §§ 186.507-.508 (Supp. 1984).
181. Ch. 85-57, § 8, 1985 Fla. Laws 295 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 187 (Supp. 1986)).
182. Ch. 85-55, 1985 Fla. Laws 207 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3215 (1985)).
183. For a discussion of the 1985 amendments to the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning Act of 1975, see Pelham et al., supra note 22, at 544-59.
184. Florida's integrated state, regional, and local comprehensive planning process is de-
scribed and analyzed in Pelham et al., supra note 22.
1992] 1001
1002 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:973
tem has a strong local comprehensive planning foundation, but it also
encompasses state and regional issues and addresses many of the other
concerns raised about Ramapo-type systems. Unlike the Ramapo
plan, a locally inspired initiative applicable only to undeveloped areas,
the Florida system is State-driven and applies to all areas. Pursuant to
state guidelines, every local government must adopt a concurrency
system that applies to both developed and undeveloped areas. These
new variations on an old theme create challenging implementation
problems and some potentially thorny legal issues.
A. The Comprehensive Planning Framework
Florida has created a pyramidal planning hierarchy. At the top of
the hierarchy is the State Comprehensive Plan, at middle level are
comprehensive regional policy plans, and at the foundation are local
comprehensive plans. The three planning levels are integrated through
consistency requirements. The goals and policies of the State Compre-
hensive Plan must be implemented through the regional policy plans
that are consistent with the state plan and through local plans that are
consistent with both the state and regional plans. Local comprehen-
sive plans must be implemented through land development regulations
and development orders that are consistent with the local plan." 5
1. State and Regional Issues
The cry of the Ramapo critics for a state and regional planning sys-
tem has been heeded in Florida. A state and regional perspective is
injected into the local planning process in three important ways. First,
local comprehensive plans must be consistent with both the state and
the applicable regional policy plan.'86 Second, local comprehensive
plans must satisfy statutory intergovernmental coordination require-
ments to ensure that extraterritorial issues are adequately addressed. 18 7
Third, the Florida Department of Community Affairs (DCA) must re-
view and approve local plans for consistency with the state and re-
gional plans and compliance with the intergovernmental coordination
and other state requirements.'88
Sitting at the zenith of the planning pyramid, the State Comprehen-
sive Plan is a "direction-setting document" that provides "long-range
policy guidance" for regional and local plans.8 9 It contains twenty-
185. Pelham et al., supra note 22, at 590.
186. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177(9)(c), .3184(1)(b) (1991).
187. Id. § 163.3177(4)(a), (6)(h).
188. Id. §§ 163.3177(9), (10), .3184(l)(b), (8)(a).
189. Id. § 187.101(1)-(2).
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seven goals with accompanying policies covering a wide range of so-
cial, economic, environmental, natural resources, conservation, and
land planning issues. 190 Of special relevance to the issue of concur-
rency are the goals and policies for land use and public facilities that
direct the coordination of land development and capital facilities.' 9'
Although the state plan "does not create regulatory authority or au-
thorize the adoption of agency rules, criteria, or standards not other-
wise authorized by law,"' 92 other state legislation requires regional
and local plans to be consistent with the goals and policies of the state
plan. 1
93
A comprehensive regional policy plan must be adopted by each of
the state's eleven regional planning agencies. 94 The regional policy
plan must set forth regional goals and policies, including growth man-
agement policies, which are consistent with and implement the goals
and policies of the State Comprehensive Plan. Among other things,
the regional plan must address and analyze the problems and needs of
the region, especially with regard to land use, water resources, trans-
portation, and infrastructure.9 5 The local comprehensive plan must be
consistent with the applicable regional policy plan.' 96
To further ensure that state and regional concerns will not be ig-
nored, the 1985 Act makes intergovernmental coordination "a major
objective of the local comprehensive planning process."' 197 Each local
comprehensive plan must be coordinated with the plans of adjacent
municipalities and counties as well as with the state and regional
plans. 98 It must contain an intergovernmental coordination element
that demonstrates, consideration of the local plan's impacts on adja-
cent local governments and the region and how coordination with the
state, regional, and other local plans will be achieved. 99
2. The Local Comprehensive Plan
As in the Ramapo plan, implementation of Florida's concurrency-_
requirement is linked to a local comprehensive planning process. Be-
fore imposition of the concurrency requirement, a local government
190. Id. § 187.201.
191. Id. § 187.201(16), (18).
192. Id. § 187.101(2).
193. Id. § 163.3184(1)(b).
194. Id. § 186.508.
195. Id. § 186.507(1), (3).
196. Id. § 163.3184(1)(b).
197. Id. § 163.3177(4)(a).
198. Id.
199. Id. § 163.3177(4)(a), (6)(h).
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must confront and resolve the basic issues of growth and develop-
ment, infrastructure needs and costs, and existing and projected reve-
nue sources. The vehicle for addressing these threshold issues is the
local comprehensive plan, which must be reviewed by DCA pursuant
to the agency's minimum criteria rule2® for compliance with state law.
Each local government must adopt a comprehensive plan. 20 The lo-
cal plan is a blueprint for the future development of the community; it
must include "principles, guidelines, and standards for the orderly
and balanced future economic, social, physical, environmental, and
fiscal development" of the local government's jurisdictional area.2
The plan must be based on and supported by the best available exist-
ing or original data,203 and it must be economically feasible.2 At a
minimum, the local plan must include elements covering future land
use; 205 capital improvements201 generally and sanitary sewer, solid
waste, drainage, potable water, and natural groundwater aquifer pro-
tection specifically; 207 conservation; 201 recreation and open space;2
housing; 210 traffic circulation; 211 intergovernmental coordination;212
coastal management (where appropriate);2 and mass transit (for local
jurisdictions of 50,000 or more people).21 4 The elements of the plan
must be internally consistent and coordinated with each other,25 and
as previously discussed, the local plan itself must be coordinated with
the comprehensive plans of adjacent communities and counties, the
region, and the state.21 6
After its adoption, the local comprehensive plan is the preeminent
instrument for regulating land use in Florida. The local plan must be
implemented through the adoption of land development regulations
that are consistent with the plan. These regulations must include pro-
visions to implement the concurrency requirement. 2 7 All develop-
200. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 9J-5 (1991).
201. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(2) (1991).
202. Id. § 163.3177(1).
203. Id. § 163.3177(8), (10)(e); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(2)(c) (1991).
204. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(2) (1991).
205. Id. § 163.3177(6)(a).
206. Id. § 163.3177(3)(a).
207. Id. § 163.3177(6)(c).
208. Id. § 163.3177(6)(d).
209. Id. § 163.3177(6)(e).
210. Id. § 163.3177(6)(f).
211. Id. § 163.3177(6)(b).
212. Id. § 163.3177(6)(h).
213. Id. § 163.3177(6)(g).
214. Id. § 163.3177(6)(i), (7)(a).
215. Id. § 163.3177(2).
216. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
217. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(I)-(2)(g).
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ment, both public and private, and all development orders approved
by local governments must be consistent with the adopted local
plan. 218
3. Accommodating Growth in Well-Balanced Communities
The Ramapo plan sought to maximize commercial and low-density
residential development to the exclusion of other land uses, despite the
Town's alleged goal of "a balanced cohesive community" and its dis-
avowal of exclusionary motives. 2 9 This strategy would not be accepta-
ble under Florida's growth management laws. The express philosophy
of this state's local planning Act is that local governments must ac-
commodate growth in well-balanced communities. 220
Each local comprehensive plan must contain a future land use plan
element demonstrating that the local government is accommodating
its anticipated growth and that it is planning for a full complement of
land uses sufficient to serve its projected population. 22' The local gov-
ernment's projected growth must be based on population estimates
and projections provided by state agencies or generated by the local
government using professionally acceptable methodologies approved
by DCA. 222 In reviewing the local plan for compliance with these state
growth management requirements, DCA will determine whether the
local government is planning for its anticipated growth. 3
The future land use plan element must provide for a full range of
land uses, including residential, commercial, and industrial, and it
must contain standards for controlling the density and intensity of de-
218. Id. § 163.3194(1)(a).
219. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 295, 302 (N.Y.), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
220. Section 163.3177(1), Florida Statutes, provides that the local comprehensive plan shall
prescribe "principles, guidelines, and standards for the orderly and balanced future economic,
social, physical, environmental, and fiscal development of the area" (emphasis added). Section
163.3177(6)(a) provides in part that the local comprehensive plan must include a future land use
plan that is "based upon surveys, studies, and data regarding the area, including the amount of
land required to accommodate anticipated growth [and] the projected population of the
area ..... " (emphasis added).
221. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a) (1991).
222. FLA. ADmI. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(2)(e) (1990).
223. In reviewing local plans, the DCA applies chapter 9J-5 of the Florida Administrative
Code, Minimum Criteria for Review of Local Government Comprehensive Plans and Determi-
nation of Compliance. These rules require that local plans must "be based on resident and sea-
sonal population estimates and projections." FLA. AroN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(2)(e) (1990).
The future land use element of the local plan must be based on these population projections, id.
at r. 9J-5.006(l)(g), and "[a]n analysis of the amount of land needed to accommodate the pro-
jected population," id. at r. 9J-5.006(2)(c).
19921 1005
1006 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 19:973
velopment.22A The distribution, location, and extent of the land uses
must be depicted on a future land use plan map or map series.2 5 Both
the element and the map must be based on an analysis of the amount
of land needed in each of the land use categories to accommodate the
projected population. 226 With regard to concurrency, the proposed fu-
ture land uses must be coordinated with the availability of public fa-
cilities and services and ensure that suitable land is available for
facilities needed to support development.227 Again, when DCA con-
ducts its compliance review of the local plan, it will consider whether
sufficient land has been allocated in the various land use categories to
support the local government's projected growth.m By combining
state planning criteria with State oversight and review, Florida seeks
to ensure that its local governments cannot use growth management
systems for exclusionary purposes.
4. Planning and Programming Capital Improvements
One of the most impressive features of Florida's local comprehen-
sive planning system is a strong capital improvements planning and
programming requirement. Local governments cannot impose the
concurrency requirement until a program for providing infrastructure
has been formulated and adopted as a component of the local com-
prehensive plan. This program must describe how, when, and where
the local government will provide infrastructure to serve development
allowed under the comprehensive plan. Because the capital improve-
ments planning and programming component is the heart of each lo-
cal concurrency system, its major features deserve special attention.
As mentioned previously, each local plan must contain a capital im-
provements element that considers "the need for and the location of
public facilities in order to encourage the efficient utilization of such
facilities. ' 229 At a minimum, the capital improvements element must
contain:
1. A component which outlines principles for construction,
extension, or increase in capacity of a public facilities, as well as a
component which outlines principles for correcting existing public
224. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a) (1991); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006(1)(a), (4)(a)
(1990).
225. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a) (1991); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006(1)(a), (4)(a)
(1990).
226. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006(2)(c) (1990).
227. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a) (1991); FLA. ADm. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)8 (1990).
228. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
229. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(3)(a) (1991).
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facility deficiencies, which are necessary to implement the
comprehensive plan. The component shall cover at least a 5-year
period.
2. Estimated public facility costs, including a delineation of when
facilities will be needed, the general location of the facilities, and
projected revenue sources to fund the facilities.
3. Standards to ensure the availability of public facilities and the
adequacy of those facilities including acceptable levels of service.230
The element must set forth a long-term capital improvements plan
covering at least a ten-year period231 and a short-term program of
scheduled improvements to be provided by the local government for
the first five years of the plan.232 To ensure that the element always
reflects current needs and conditions, it must be reviewed annually
and modified if necessary by a formally adopted plan amendment.23
Following adoption of the local comprehensive plan, all public facili-
ties provided by the local government must be consistent with the cap-
ital improvements element.23 4
The capital improvements element has several important purposes.
First, it must ascertain and evaluate the community's public facility
needs as identified in the specific infrastructure elements for sanitary
sewer, solid waste, drainage, potable water, recreation and open
space, and transportation. 235 This evaluation must include both exist-
ing deficiencies and future needs. 6 Second, the element must estimate
the cost of the capital improvements in the five-year schedule.237
Third, the element must analyze the local government's capability to
finance the five-year schedule of improvements by identifying and
evaluating the available revenue sources by facility type. 238 This analy-
sis must show that the program is financially feasible. 239 Fourth, the
element must establish policies for the timing and location of public
facilities to support sufficient land development patterns consistent
with the future land use element. 240 Fifth, the element must formulate
policies for ensuring that the concurrency requirement is satisfied.24'
230. Id.
231. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(4) (1990).
232. Id. at r. 9J-5.016(4)(a).
233. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177(3)(b), .3187(2) (1991).
234. Id. § 163.3177(3)(b).
235. FIA. ArMN. CODE ANN" r. 9J-5.016(1) (1990); FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(b)-(c) (1991).
236. FA. ADmIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.016(2)(b) (1990).
237. Id. at r. 9J-5.016(2)(c).
238. Id. at r. 9J-5.016(2)(f).
239. Id. at r. 9J-5.016(2)(f), (4)(a).
240. Id. at r. 9J-5.016(2)(a), (e).
241. Id. at r. 9J-5.016(3)(b).
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In sum, the capital improvements element represents local govern-
ment's obligation to provide the adequate public facilities needed to
accommodate future growth consistent with its adopted land use plan,
and it is designed to ensure that this obligation is fulfilled.242
Despite their impressive scope and detail, the statutory and rule
provisions pertaining to capital improvements programming fail to
adequately address the critically important distinction between exist-
ing infrastructure deficiencies and the demand for additional infra-
structure generated by new development. Both the statute and the rule
require that local governments address both existing infrastructure de-
ficiencies and projected new infrastructure needs.m3 However, they do
not specify whether this is to be accomplished simultaneously or
whether the elimination of existing deficiencies can be accomplished
over a longer period of time. The overall import of the rule provisions
is that existing infrastructure deficiencies are to be eliminated simulta-
neously with the provision of new infrastructure required for new de-
velopment during the adopted capital improvements schedule. While
it may be reasonable to require provision of infrastructure to serve
new development contemporaneous with the permitting of the devel-
opment, it is not realistic or feasible to cure in a short period of time
existing infrastructure deficits, especially those relating to expensive
facilities such as transportation and stormwater management, which
have accrued over decades. Nor is it feasible to prohibit all new devel-
opment until all existing infrastructure deficiencies have been elimi-
nated. The practical solution is to provide for the long-term reduction
and elimination of existing deficiencies created by previously permit-
ted development while requiring immediate provision of new infra-
structure needed to serve new development.
5. Providing Affordable Housing
As the criticisms of the Ramapo plan illustrate, growth manage-
ment systems are frequently alleged to be exclusionary in purpose or
effect, especially with regard to low-income groups. This problem has
been considered and addressed in Florida. Recognizing the importance
of housing and the possibility that growth management systems may
be used for exclusionary purposes, Florida's comprehensive planning
laws emphasize the provision of affordable housing for all income
groups. The housing goal of the State Comprehensive Plan calls on
the public and private sectors to "increase the affordability and avail-
242. See infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text.
243. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(3)(a) (1991); FLA. AmiN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.016(2)(c) (1990).
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ability of housing for low-income and moderate-income persons." 244
In pursuit of this goal, the local comprehensive plan must contain a
housing element that gives direction to the housing efforts of the pub-
lic and private sectors. 245 The element must set forth standards and
plans for providing housing for all existing and projected future resi-
dents and "adequate sites for future housing, including housing for
low-income and moderate-income families. ' 246 Based on data and
analysis relating to the projected housing need for all "anticipated po-
pulations," the housing element must state the means by which the
local government will provide housing for the projected population,
with special emphasis on providing adequate housing and housing
sites for low- and moderate-income households. 247 Under these state
housing requirements, local governments cannot lawfully use their
comprehensive plans to exclude low-and moderate-income housing.
On the contrary, they have an affirmative duty to include adequate
provisions for such housing in their plans. 248
6. Preventing Urban Sprawl
A central policy of Florida's growth management laws is the dis-
couragement of urban sprawl. 249 The State Comprehensive Plan con-
tains numerous goals and policies designed to prevent sprawling
development patterns. Several of these goals and policies relate di-
rectly to the coordination of land development and the provision of
public facilities. For example, the land use goal provides that "devel-
opment shall be directed to those areas which have in place, or have
agreements to provide, the land and water resources, fiscal abilities,
and service capacity to accommodate growth in an environmentally
acceptable manner. " 210 The public facilities goal directs that the State
"shall protect the substantial investments in public facilities that al-
ready exist and shall plan for and finance new facilities to serve resi-
dents in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner.' '251 These goals are
244. FLA. STAT. § 187.201(5)(a) (1991).
245. Id. § 163.3177(6)(f); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.010 (1991).
246. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(f) (1991).
247. FLA. ADWN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.010(2)(b), (2)(01., (2)(03 (1990).
248. For a discussion of the state statutory requirements for affordable housing and plan-
ning strategies for satisfying those requirements, see Department of Community Affairs, Af-
fordable Housing Problem Deserves Careful Treatment in Local Comprehensive Plans,
(Technical Memo, Vol. 5, No. 9, Oct., 1990).
249. See generally Dep't of Comm'y Aff., Discouraging Urban Sprawl in Local Government
Comprehensive Plans (Technical Memo, Vol. 4, No. 4) (undated).
250. FLA. STAT. § 187.201(16)(a) (1991).
251. Id. § 187.201(18)(a).
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accompanied by policies promoting more efficient development pat-
terns and the maximization of the use of existing public facilities. 25 2
Collectively, these goals and policies point toward the timing and se-
quential development controls of Ramapo, which were designed to
prevent "leapfrog" sprawl.
This state policy direction toward more compact and efficient devel-
opment patterns is further reinforced by policies designed to prevent
scattered and poorly planned development in rural areas. For exam-
ple, the State Comprehensive Plan "encourages a separation of urban
and rural land uses while protecting water supplies, resource develop-
ment, and fish and wildlife habitats. ' 25 3 It also calls for the conserva-
tion and maintenance of forests, wetlands, important habitat areas,
and agricultural and natural resources. 25 4
Florida's antisprawl initiative goes beyond the prevention of leap-
frogging development patterns, which was the primary thrust of Ra-
mapo's timing and sequential controls. It also addresses the issue of
excessive low-density residential or one-dimensional development pat-
terns which, according to some commentators, was programmed by
the Ramapo plan. Hence, the land use goal of the State Comprehen-
sive Plan seeks to "[e]nhance the liveability and character of urban
areas through the encouragement of an attractive and functional mix
of living, working, shopping, and recreational activities. ' 255
These state goals and policies have been explicated and refined
through DCA's rules and policies for the preparation and review of
local comprehensive plans. Each local plan must contain a future land
use element that designates future land use patterns. 256 Among other
things, the element must depict future land use patterns that are coor-
dinated with the availability of facilities and services and that discour-
age the proliferation of urban sprawl. 257 Based on the goals and
policies of the State Comprehensive Plan and the well-established un-
derstanding of the term within the planning profession, the DCA, in
reviewing local plans for compliance with state planning requirements,
applies the following definition of urban sprawl:
The term 'urban sprawl' . . . is used to describe certain kinds of
growth or development patterns. It refers to scattered, untimely,
poorly planned urban development that occurs in urban fringe and
252. Id. § 187.201(16)(b)(I), (18)(b)I.-2.
253. Id. § 187.201(16)(b)2.
254. Id. § 187.201(10)(b)l.
255. Id. § 187.201(16)(b)3.
256. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.006 (1990).
257. Id. at r. 9J-5.006(3)(b)7., S.
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rural areas and frequently invades lands important for environmental
and natural resource protection. Urban sprawl typically manifests
itself in one or more of the following patterns: (1) leapfrog
development; (2) ribbon or strip development; and (3) large expanse
of low-density, single-dimensional development. 2 8
This judicially sanctioned "consensus" definition219 represents a com-
prehensive approach to the problem of urban sprawl that was lacking
in the Ramapo system.
B. The Concurrency Requirement
Florida's concurrency requirement is an integral part of the state's
comprehensive planning legislation. However, the statutory concur-
rency provisions offer little practical guidance for its actual implemen-
tation and application. Consequently, the regulatory parameters of
the requirement have been largely developed through DCA's adminis-
trative rulemaking and local plan compliance review processes, albeit
with considerable consultation with the Florida Legislature. 260 The fol-
258. Discouraging Urban Sprawl in Local Comprehensive Plans, supra note 249, at 2; see,
e.g., Department of Comm'y Aff. v. Charlotte County & City of Punta Gorda, 90 FLA. ENvL.
& L.U. REp. 130 (Admin. Comm'n 1990) (finding Charlotte County plan not in compliance
primarily because of its failure to discourage urban sprawl).
259. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Brevard v. Department of Comm'y Aff., 585
So. 2d 965, 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Two homebuilders associations challenged the validity of
DCA's urban sprawl policies on various grounds in a § 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, administra-
tive hearing. In affirming the hearing officer's rejection of the challenge, the First District Court
of Appeal upheld the hearing officer's finding that there is a "consensus on the meaning of
urban sprawl" within the planning profession. The court's opinion quotes a "consensus" defini-
tion virtually identical to the definition used by DCA. Id. at 968-69.
260. The DCA worked closely with the Legislature in formulating its policies regarding the
meaning and implementation of the concurrency requirement. For example, the agency's first
major policy statement on the meaning and application of concurrency was issued in response to
a formal inquiry from Senator Gwen Margolis, Democrat, North Miami Beach, Chair of the
Senate Select Committee on Local Government Infrastructure Funding and Impact Fees. In her
letter, Senator Margolis raised a number of questions about DCA's interpretation of the concur-
rency requirement. The letter raised two possible interpretations of the requirement:
The opposing interpretations seem to be: (1) infrastructure must be physically present
to support a development at the level of service standard set out in the comprehensive
plan before development can be permitted; or (2) can construction be severed from the
impact of development so that development will be permitted to proceed, recognizing
that there will be a short-term reduction in the level of service, as long as there is a
plan in place to provide infrastructure to meet the development's impact over time.
Letter from Gwen Margolis, Chair, S. Select Comm. on Local Gov't Infrastructure Funding &
Impact Fees, to Thomas Pelham, Sec., DCA (Jan. 12, 1988) (available at Fla. Dep't of State,
Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). In its response to Senator Margolis, the Department stated
its position that concurrency should be implemented as a planning concept rather than as a strict
regulatory requirement:
The Department rejects as totally unreasonable and unworkable the position that con-
1012 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:973
lowing sections discuss the statutory and rule bases for the concur-
rency requirement, the categories of public facilities subject to the
requirement, the standards used to measure the availability and ade-
quacy of those facilities, the governmental obligation to provide the
facilities and the related problem of infrastructure funding, the rela-
tionship between concurrency and other state growth management
goals, and the enforcement of the concurrency requirement.
1. The Statutory and Rule Bases of the Requirement
Although the term "concurrency" did not appear in either the State
Comprehensive Plan or the local planning legislation enacted in 1985,
these two acts together established the statutory foundation for Flori-
da's concurrency system. In addition to establishing the comprehen-
sive planning framework discussed in the previous section, the 1985
legislation enunciated the basic principle of concurrency. For exam-
ple, the land use goal of the State Comprehensive Plan provides that
"development shall be directed to those areas which have in place, or
have agreements to provide, the land and water resources, fiscal abili-
ties, and service capacity to accommodate growth in an environmen-
tally acceptable manner. "261 Similarly, the public facilities goal directs
currency can only mean that from the moment the concurrency requirement goes into
effect, all necessary facilities must actually be in place before a development permit
can be issued. The legislature could not possibly have intended such an interpretation
because it is totally unrealistic and unworkable. The Department rejects that approach
to the statute.
Letter from Thomas Pelham to Gwen Margolis (Mar. 7, 1988) (available at Fla. Dep't of State,
Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). The Department emphasized the need for flexibility in im-
plementing the concurrency requirement:
We all need to keep in mind that we are dealing with a planning statute. Planning by
its very nature must be flexible. No plan is ever perfect and no plan can be written
today that is going to accurately reflect in every way conditions next year, much less
five years from now. Any planning process, to be effective, must have flexibility. I
believe that is true of the concurrency requirement as well as all other aspects of the
local comprehensive planning process. "Flexibility" is not to be equated with "mean-
ingless." The concurrency requirement must have some teeth in it; it cannot be de-
fined as allowing the provision of adequate facilities to be postponed indefinitely or
for unreasonable periods of time, nor can it be construed to allow the issuance of
development permits without assurance that the necessary facilities will be available
within a reasonable period of time.
Id. at 2. On numerous occasions, the author, as DCA Secretary, outlined the agency's concur-
rency policy to legislative committees, including the identification of the facilities subject to the
concurrency requirement. See, e.g., Fla. H.R. Comm. on Comm'y Aff., transcript of proceed-
ings at 3-5 (Feb. 25, 1988) (copy at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.)
(statement of Thomas Pelham). To the author's knowledge, from 1987 through 1991, the Legis-
lature never seriously considered any proposal to alter the basic thrust of DCA's concurrency
policies.
261. FLA. STAT. § 187.201(16)(a) (1991).
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that "Florida shall protect the substantial investments in public facili-
ties that already exist and shall plan for and finance new facilities to
serve residents in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner.' '262
To effectuate these state planning goals, the 1985 Florida Legisla-
ture also enacted the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and
Land Development Regulation Act (1985 Act). 263 This Act is intended
in part to "facilitate the adequate and efficient provision of transpor-
tation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, recreational facilities, hous-
ing, and other requirements and services. ' ' 264 Accordingly, the 1985
Act required local governments to adopt land development regulations
that:
Provide that public facilities and services meet or exceed the
standards established in the capital improvements element required
by s. 163.3177 and are available when needed for the
development. . . . [A] local government shall not issue a
development order or permit which results in a reduction in the level
of services for the affected public facilities below the level of services
provided in the comprehensive plan of the local government.2 6s
In addition, the 1985 Legislature directed DCA to prepare, adopt, and
present to the 1986 Legislature for review a rule setting forth the mini-
mum criteria to be used by the agency in determining whether local
plans are in compliance with the adequate public facilities and other
state planning requirements. 266
In 1986, the concurrency requirement crystallized when the Legisla-
ture amended the 1985 Act in several important respects. First, the
Legislature added language that expressly recognizes and establishes
the concurrency requirement:
It is the intent of the Legislature that public facilities and services
needed to support development shall be available concurrent with the
impacts of such development. In meeting this intent, public facility
and service availability shall be deemed sufficient if the public
facilities and services for a development are phased, or the
development is phased, so that the public facilities and those related
262. Id. § 187.201(18)(a). This goal is reinforced by the governmental efficiency goal which
provides: "Florida governments shall economically and efficiently provide the amount and qual-
ity of services required by the public." Id. § 187.201(21)(a).
263. Ch. 85-55, 1985 Fla. Laws 207 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3215 (Supp. 1986)).
264. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(3) (1991).
265. Id. § 163.3202(2)(g) (1985).
266. Ch. 85-55, § 6, 1985 Fla. Laws 207, 215 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(9) (Supp.
1986)).
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services which are deemed necessary by the local government to
operate the facilities necessitated by that development, are available
concurrent with the impacts of the development.2 7
Second, the Legislature provided that the concurrency doctrine
must be implemented no later that one year after a local government
was required to submit its comprehensive plan to DCA for compliance
review. 268 Third, the Legislature reaffirmed and made even more ex-
plicit the obligation of local governments to include in their compre-
hensive plans level-of-service (LOS) standards for public facilities that
will govern the issuance of development orders and permits. 269 Fourth,
the Legislature reviewed and conditionally approved chapter 9J-5 of
the Florida Administrative Code, the DCA's minimum criteria rule
for compliance review of local comprehensive plans.270 Chapter 9J-5
incorporates the express statutory concurrency requirement that was
added to the 1985 Act in the 1986 legislative session.27'
Although chapter 9J-5, as originally adopted by DCA, set forth de-
tailed criteria for the preparation of the various local plan elements, it
provided little or no express guidance on several threshold concur-
rency issues: What public facilities are subject to concurrency? What
standards will be used to measure the adequacy of public facilities?
When will facilities be considered available for purposes of the con-
currency requirement? These issues remained for DCA to resolve
through further rulemaking and the local plan compliance review
process. After developing and experimenting with its concurrency pol-
icies through the compliance review process, DCA in November 1989,
formally adopted a concurrency rule as an amendment to chapter 9J-
5.272 This rule identifies the categories and facilities that are subject to
the concurrency requirement, establishes standards for determining
when those facilities are available, and requires each local government
to adopt a concurrency management system.
2. The Public Facilities Subject to Concurrency
The Florida Legislature has not satisfactorily dealt with the issue of
which public facilities should be subject to the concurrency require-
267. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(h) (1991) (emphasis added).
268. Id. § 163.3202(g).
269. "The Legislature recognizes that under this section, local governments are charged with
setting levels of service for public facilities in their comprehensive plans in accordance with
which development orders and permits will be issued pursuant to s. 163.3202(2)(g)." Id.
§ 163.3177(10)(f.
270. Id. § 163.3177(10).
271. See, e.g., FLA. ADMI. ANN. CODE ANN. r. § 9J-5.006(3)(c)3. (1990).
272. Id. at r. 9J-5.055 (1990).
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ment. Neither the 1985 Act nor the original chapter 9J-5 expressly de-
fines the public facilities which are subject to the concurrency
requirement. The provision of the 1985 Act which contains the con-
currency requirement speaks in terms of the "public facilities and
services needed to support development.' '273 The definitions section of
the Act defines "public facilities" generally to mean all major capital
improvements. 274 The Act contains no definition of services. On the
other hand, chapter 9J-5 defines public facilities much more specifi-
cally than does the 1985 Act. 275 However, the rule sets forth a broad
definition of "services," which includes "educational, health care, so-
cial and other programs necessary to support the programs, public fa-
cilities, and infrastructure set out in the local plan or required by
local, state, or federal law." 276
These definitions of public facilities and services are not helpful in
defining the facilities that are subject to the concurrency requirement.
Under the Florida system, concurrency cannot be effectively imple-
mented without LOS standards for measuring the adequacy of the fa-
cilities and services. However, local governments are required to
adopt LOS standards only for those facilities covered by mandatory
plan elements. 277 Because the 1985 Act mandates plan facilities ele-
ments only for transportation, sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage,
potable water, and recreation and open space, local governments are
not required to establish LOS standards for other facilities. Accord-
ingly, the DCA concurrency rule provides that only those facilities are
subject to the state concurrency requirement. However, local govern-
ments may voluntarily subject other facilities such as educational,
health, and law enforcement facilities to the concurrency requirement
by including them in their local plans with LOS standards and ex-
pressly providing that they are subject to concurrency. 27 8
The definition issue has serious implications not only for the imple-
mentation of a concurrency system, but also for broader social con-
cerns. A concurrency system covering only a few facilities is obviously
easier to implement than one encompassing a broad range of infra-
structure categories. Consequently, administrative convenience and
practical necessity may dictate a narrow definition of facilities in the
early implementation stages of a new system. However, a narrow defi-
nition can dramatically reorder funding priorities in times of limited
273. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10)(h) (1991).
274. Id. § 163.3164(23).
275. See FLA. ADum. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.003(76) (1990).
276. Id. at r. 9J-5.003(91).
277. Id. at r. 9J-5.016(3)(c)1., 4.; FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(3)(a)3., (10)(f)-(h).
278. FLA. ADwN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055 (1991).
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public resources. The pressure of meeting the concurrency require-
ment and avoiding development moratoria may tend to direct availa-
ble resources to those facilities subject to the requirement. If the
definition includes only basic physical infrastructure; e.g., roads,
sewer, drainage, and solid waste, then "social infrastructure" such as
schools, health care, social welfare programs, and the criminal justice
system may be overlooked or shortchanged.27 9 On the other hand, if a
broad definition is adopted without adequate general funding systems,
local governments may attempt to shift even more of the burden of
paying for growth to developers and new residents. These possibilities
become even more likely if the concurrency requirement is imposed on
local governments by a state legislature without either ensuring that
adequate local revenue sources are available or without providing
state funding. Consequently, the definition issue should be carefully
considered and clearly resolved by any legislative body that adopts a
concurrency requirement.
3. The Standards for Measuring the Adequacy and Availability of
Public Facilities
The capital improvements element of a local comprehensive plan
must establish "[s]tandards to ensure the availability of public facili-
ties and the adequacy of those facilities including acceptable levels of
service.'"'2 The Legislature defined "availability," but, unfortu-
nately, included no definition of adequacy and provided no guidance
for establishing standards for measuring it other than a requirement
that it must be measured in terms of LOS standards. 81 Consequently,
DCA and local governments have been compelled to develop stan-
dards through the administrative rulemaking and plan compliance re-
view processes.
Generally, although local governments have broad discretion in set-
ting LOS standards, DCA requires as a matter of policy that the stan-
dards must be adequate, realistic, and financially feasible.2 12 An
279. At a recent public forum on Florida's growth problems, Dade County State Attorney
Janet Reno expressed this concern in the following terms: "I came to express my deep frustra-
tion almost to the point of outrage that there is nobody up there [in Tallahassee] representing
social services. It makes it seem like all you're concerned about is pouring concrete and building
things." Heather Dewar & Michael Crook, Move Quickly to Curb Growth, State Told, MiuA
HERALD, Aug. 30, 1991, at B2.
280. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(3)(a)3. (1991) (emphasis added).
281. FLA. ADhnN. CODE ANN. r. 91-5.003(45) (1990); Id. at r. 9J-5.003(7) (1991).
282. See Dep't of Comm'y Aff., The Evolution and Requirements of the CMS Rule (Techni-
cal Memo, Vol. 6, No. 3, Aug. 1991); Thomas G. Pelham, Defining 'Adequate Public Facilities'
Under Florida's Concurrency System, in GRowmH MANAGEMENT SUMMER SCHOOL, 197-202 (Fla.
Chain. of Comm., 1991).
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adequate LOS standard is one that meets the public's basic needs and
expectations. For example, each person needs a certain number of gal-
lons of potable water each day and has a reasonable expectation that
the local utility will provide that amount. A realistic LOS standard is
one that is capable of being maintained by the local government. A
local plan must demonstrate that if the LOS falls below the estab-
lished standard, there is a specific plan to achieve and maintain the
adopted LOS standard in the reasonably near future. A financially
feasible LOS is one that the local government has the demonstrated
financial ability to achieve and maintain.8 3
Specific standards for measuring the adequacy of each facility are
not as well defined. The 1985 Act does not set minimum performance
standards for public facilities, nor does it contain any general intent
language indicating the purpose to be achieved by setting LOS stan-
dards, such as the promotion of public health and safety. Similarly,
with the exception of transportation, DCA has not adopted rules that
establish statewide minimum standards for measuring the adequacy of
specific facilities. For the other facilities, DCA, in its compliance re-
view of local plans, has relied upon generally accepted national or
state standards. These standards have evolved over time, based upon
an accumulation of information concerning the capacity of facilities
needed to serve basic human needs, the regulations or standards
adopted by other state or federal agencies such as the Florida Depart-
ment of Environmental Regulation and the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, and the data and analysis presented by local
governments to justify the specific level of services adopted in their
local plans. 2 4
In the area of transportation, DCA has provided more specific
guidance for state roads, primarily because another state agency as-
serts jurisdiction over the state highway system. The Florida Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) has statutory authority for
maintaining the state highway system and for setting operational LOS
standards for those roads385 Accordingly, DCA by rule requires that
local governments, "to the maximum extent feasible as determined by
the local government," adopt LOS standards for state roads that are
compatible with DOT's standards. 2 6 If a local government adopts a
283. The Evolution and Requirements of the CMS Rule, supra note 282, at 5; FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(l)(b) (1991).
284. Pelham, supra note 282, at 201-02.
285. FLA. STAT. §§ 334.044(1), (10), .045(1) (1991).
286. FLA. ADUN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(l)(d) (1991). This rule represents a compromise
between the assertion by local governments of their authority under the 1985 Act to set LOS
standards and the jurisdictional claim of DOT under its state enabling legislation.
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level-of-service standard for state roads that is not compatible with
DOT's standards, the burden is on the local government to demon-
strate that it is not feasible to adhere to DOT's standards in the partic-
ular situation. The local government may meet this burden in various
ways, including a showing that the deviation is necessary to meet
other statewide planning goals and policies.2 7
Neither the Legislature nor DCA has provided sufficient guidance
to local governments in the setting of standards for measuring the ad-
equacy of facilities. To illustrate, the following questions are not cur-
rently addressed by statute or administrative rule: Should the criteria
for measuring the adequacy of public facilities be based on minimal
public health and safety considerations or can they be used to pro-
mote a higher "quality of life" or a greater degree of public conven-
ience? For example, although only a certain amount of park and
recreational space and facilities may be deemed necessary for the pub-
lic health, may a particular community enrich its quality of life by
adopting higher standards? Similarly, although a much lower LOS
standard for transportation would be consistent with public safety,
may a local government seek to enhance the public convenience by
setting much higher standards? These issues are not academic; they
have practical implications for the purposes and effects of local con-
currency systems. Under the guise of promoting a higher quality of
life, a particular community might attempt to exclude development by
setting unnecessarily high standards and exacting larger impact fees
from developers to meet those standards. If building permits are de-
nied or a development moratorium is declared because of the failure
to meet these higher standards, a takings claim is arguably strength-
ened because the regulation may not be reasonably related to the pub-
lic health or safety. To avoid these problems and abuses, either the
Legislature or DCA should provide more specific guidelines for the
establishment of LOS standards.
By rule, DCA has established much more specific standards for de-
termining when facilities are to be available for purposes of satisfying
the concurrency requirement. Local governments may establish
stricter availability standards, but at a minimum they must meet the
criteria in DCA's concurrency rule. 211 In establishing standards for de-
termining availability, DCA has created three categories of facilities
based upon the importance of the facility and the practical problems
involved in constructing the facility. The timing of the actual provi-
287. Id. DOT's standards apply only to state roads. Local governments therefore have much
broader discretion in establishing LOS standards for local roads.
288. FIA. ADwN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.003(7) (1991).
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sion of the facilities varies among the three categories, with the most
lenient treatment accorded to transportation because it takes more
time and money to provide transportation facilities. 289
Category I facilities include potable water, sanitary sewer, solid
waste, and drainage, the most fundamental facilities without which
development cannot be occupied without serious threats to public
health and safety. To meet the statutory requirement of availability
concurrent with the impacts of development, these facilities must be
either: (1) in place when a development permit is issued, (2) guaran-
teed by a condition in the development permit to be in place by the
time the development impacts occur, (3) under construction when the
development permit is issued, or (4) guaranteed in an enforceable de-
velopment agreement that includes one or more of these provisions. 21
Category II facilities include parks and recreation. These facilities
will be deemed available concurrent with development if they comply
with the standards for Category I facilities or if they are subject to a
binding executed contract providing for commencement of construc-
tion within one year from the date the permit is issued. 291 Parks and
recreational facilities are accorded more relaxed treatment than Cate-
gory I facilities292 because, while important, they are deemed less es-
sential to public health and safety.293
Category III facilities include roads and mass transit. These trans-
portation facilities will meet the availability requirement if they com-
ply with either Category I or II standards or if they are to be provided
pursuant to an adopted concurrency management system based upon
a financially feasible capital improvements program and concurrency
regulations that meet certain other requirements established by DCA
in its concurrency rule.29 Among these requirements is a five-year
schedule of capital improvements that must demonstrate that con-
struction of the necessary road or mass transit facilities is scheduled to
commence in or before the third year of the five-year schedule and a
provision in the local comprehensive plan that a plan amendment will
be required to eliminate, defer, or delay construction of any road or
289. See Steven L. Eggert, Traffic-Linked Growth Control in California, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q.
481, 483-84 (1989).
290. FLA. ADMIaN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(2)(a) (1990).
291. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055(2)(b).
292. Id.
293. As the DCA Secretary and one of the principal drafters of the concurrency rule, the
author made the decision to accord parks and recreational facilities more flexible treatment
based on the belief that they are less essential to public health and safety than such basic infra-
structure items as water and sewer facilities.
294. FLA. ADmiN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(2)(c) (1990).
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mass transit facility needed to maintain the adopted LOS standard. 95
4. The Special Case of Transportation
For numerous reasons, transportation has been the most difficult
facility category to subject to effective concurrency management. A
large portion of Florida's existing infrastructure deficiencies relate to
transportation facilities; the state already has many miles of back-
logged roads. Transportation facilities are much costlier and take sig-
nificantly more time to construct than do the other public facilities. 29
Local governments are not able to internalize traffic impacts in their
communities because they cannot control access to roads that cross
jurisdictional boundaries. Because much highway traffic originates
from outside the local government's domain, traffic congestion can-
not be effectively controlled by the local development permitting proc-
ess as can, for example, demand for water and sewer services. 29
Methodologically, accurately measuring road capacity is a more diffi-
cult and controversial proposition than determining the capacity of
water and sewer systems that have absolute and easily measurable vol-
ume limitations.298 DCA has exacerbated the problem by requiring
LOS standards for each road segment.2 9 This approach works satis-
factorily in rural areas with limited roads and traffic, but it is totally
unrealistic and impracticable in urban areas where transportation sys-
tems consist of a much more complex network of roads and public
transit. Finally, reflecting the lack of an effective state transportation
plan, DCA's approach to transportation concurrency has emphasized
and encouraged more roads and automobiles rather than the public
transit and multimodal transportation systems needed in large urban
areas. 0o
DCA has recognized some of these problems by giving local govern-
ments much greater flexibility in dealing with transportation concur-
rency in their local plans. For example, recognizing the undesirability
of traffic-related moratoria and the fact that traffic congestion, while
it may be inconvenient, does not affect public health and safety to the
same degree as inadequate water, sewer, and drainage facilities, DCA
has found in compliance local plans that allow continuing develop-
295. Id.
296. STATE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN COMMITTEE, KEYS TO FLORIDA'S FUTURE: WINNING IN A
COMPETITIVE WORLD 3, 13, 34-36 (1987). Among other things, the Committee stated that about
27% of all state highways are congested and that about 60% of the highways in Florida's urban
areas are extremely congested, id. at 13, and that "[f]rom concept to concrete, it takes nine years
to build a road in Florida." Id. at 34. See also Eggert, supra note 289, at 483-84.
297. Eggert, supra note 289, at 483-84.
298. See Timothy T. Jackson, Adequate Public Facilities: The Transportation Options, in
GROWTH MANAGEMENT SUMMER SCHOOL supra note 282, at 207.
299. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(3), .007(3)(c)l. (1990).
300. In recognition of this problem, DCA is now proposing an optional approach to achiev-
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ment on backlogged systems while the local government eliminates ex-
isting deficiencies over a ten-, twelve-, or fifteen-year period.3 °0
Unfortunately, however, DCA considered and then abandoned a pro-
posed concurrency rule amendment that would have authorized the
system-wide, averaging approach in designated transportation concur-
rency management areas in urban areas throughout the state. 02 In-
stead, DCA-in conjunction with DOT-is now proposing a rule
amendment that would give local governments total discretion to set
traffic LOS standards for designated urban districts for which inte-
grated, multimodal urban motility plans have been adopted and which
produce an undefined "adequate level of mobility."303 Because of the
complexity of the proposed rule and its onerous planning require-
ments, it will probably afford little immediate relief for most local
governments. Accordingly, the Florida Legislature should authorize
use of the areawide, averaging approach tied to long-range capital im-
provements plans of up to ten or fifteen years in urban areas that have
substantial transportation infrastructure deficits.3°4
In addition, the Legislature should resolve the transportation-re-
lated conflicts over concurrency between the DOT and local govern-
ments. First, DOT insisted that it should designate LOS standards for
state roads despite local governments' contention that, for purposes
of concurrency, these standards are the prerogative of the local au-
thorities making development permitting decisions. The provisions of
chapter 9J-5 discussed in the preceding sections represent an uneasy
compromise on the issue, which the Legislature should address di-
rectly.
Second, many local officials and private developers have com-
plained that local governments should not have to enforce the concur-
ing transportation concurrency. The agency's proposal would allow local governments to desig-
nate transportation concurrency management areas linked to a transportation mobility element
containing a "plan for a multi-modal, multi-option transportation system which places less em-
phasis on accommodating the single-occupancy vehicle and encourages the development of com-
pact, pedestrian-oriented urban areas, promotes energy efficient development patterns, protects
air quality, and provides more efficient mobility of residents and goods." 17 Fla. Admin.
Weekly 6105, 6107 (Dec. 27, 1991) (Proposed Transp. Concurrency Mgmt. Areas Rule).
301. See, e.g., Department of Comm'y Aff. v. Pasco County, Stipulated Settlement Agree-
ment, Case No. 89-4406GM, Exh. B, at 20 (DOAH 1990) (permitting the county to deviate from
DOT's LOS standards on state roads as long as the overall road system was brought up to
standard within 15 years).
302. See Department of Comm'y Aff., Proposed Transp. Concurrency Mgmt. Areas Rule
(Workshop Draft, Jan. 11, 1991) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee,
Fla.).
303. 17 Fla. Admin. Weekly 6105, 6106 (Dec. 27, 1991) (Proposed Transp. Concurrency
Mgmt. Areas Rule). This proposal does have some positive and progressive features, however.
See supra note 300.
304. Professor Robert Freilich recommended this approach to the City of San Diego. See
Freilich & White, supra note 1, at 943-45.
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rency requirement on state roads if the state government is not also
required to satisfy concurrency by paying for the improvements in
state roads that are needed to accommodate development. 05 Legally,
this is a specious argument; concurrency applies to the issuance of de-
velopment permits, and local governments, not the State, grant these
permits.2 6 Politically and practically, however, the State has tradition-
ally assumed responsibility for the state road system that has been re-
lied on by local governments and the private sector to support and
serve locally permitted development. If full responsibility for trans-
portation facilities to accommodate traffic generated by new develop-
ment is to be shifted to local governments, the transfer should be
accomplished gradually and with adequate transportation revenue
sources for local governments.
Regardless of the accommodation finally reached by the state and
local governments as to responsibility for transportation, it is impera-
tive that the Legislature provide the following: (1) a state transporta-
305. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 40, at 245.
306. The issue of whether state government is subject to the concurrency requirement and
therefore has responsibility for providing or funding facilities, surfaced during the early stages of
the plan review process. Letter from Rep. C. Fred Jones, Dem., Auburndale, Chair, Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Comm'y Aff., to Gov. Bob Martinez (Jan. 25, 1989) (formal letter of inquiry) (avail-
able at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). In his response to this inquiry,
Governor Martinez enunciated a key concurrency concept:
It is important to understand that the levels of service on public facilities-and there-
fore, concurrency-are fundamentally linked to land use decisions made at the local
level. As local governments increase the densities of local land uses or the frequency of
permit issuance, development pressure is placed on public facilities and levels of serv-
ice may begin to degrade. If a public facility begins to significantly degrade under
these circumstances, the local government has but three alternatives to comply with
the concurrency requirement: it may amend its plan to adopt a lower level of service
for that public facility, it may improve the management or structure of the facility or
build new facilities to accommodate the impacts of new development, or it may adjust
the density and intensity of [new] development that may occur under its land use plan
to lessen the impacts on the facility.
Letter from Peter M. Dunbar, Gen. Coun., Office of the Gov., to Rep. C. Fred Jones, (Feb. 7,
1989) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). Because "concur-
rency is fundamentally tied to the zoning and permitting processes that occur at the local level,"
the Governor's General Counsel concluded that there is no basis or reason for subjecting state
government to the concurrency requirement and accurately observed that the 1985 Act imposes
the requirement only on local governments. Id. at 2-3. However, Governor Martinez emphasized
in his response that the State has a responsibility to ensure that local governments satisfy concur-
rency at the local level:
DOT and other state agencies have a responsibility for planning public facilities and
building public facilities in accordance with the state's plans, and [the] local govern-
ments should be able to rely on the commitments of those agencies when the local
governments calculate the need for local infrastructure. It would be unfair and un-
workable to require a level of planning and commitment from local governments that
the state itself is unwilling to achieve.
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tion policy that adequately addresses the need for integrated,
multimodal urban transportation systems and with which local plans
and concurrency systems must be consistent; and (2) adequate funding
sources for the transportation facilities needed to implement the state
plan.
5. The Governmental Obligation to Provide Adequate Public
Facilities
The 1985 Act does not expressly impose upon local governments a
duty to provide the facilities necessary to comply with the concurrency
requirement. However, this obligation is implicit in the relevant provi-
sions of the Act and chapter 9J-5. The Act's general intent language
provides that the legislation is intended to enable local governments to
"facilitate the adequate and efficient provision" of public facilities. a07
With regard to concurrency, the express intent of the Act is "that
public facilities and services needed to support development shall be
available concurrent with the impacts of such development. 30 8 Local
governments' obligation to provide these public facilities is also mani-
fest in the statutory requirements for the capital improvements ele-
ment of the local plan. The element must set forth at least a five-year
program for providing facilities necessary to implement the compre-
hensive plan, estimate the cost of providing those facilities, and estab-
lish standards to ensure that those facilities will be available and
adequate.3°9 Public facilities to be provided by the local government
must be consistent with the capital improvements element. 10 All de-
velopment and all local development orders must be consistent with
the comprehensive plan, including the capital improvements element
and the future land use plan element .3 1 The statutory provisions re-
garding the individual facilities elements of the plan also require local
governments to demonstrate how it will provide facilities and services
to keep pace with its projected growth. 3 2 Collectively, these statutory
provisions impose on local government an obligation to provide the
facilities and services needed to accommodate development consistent
with the concurrency requirement, and they should be construed in
this manner to accomplish the purposes and objectives of Florida's
growth management legislation.31 3
307. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(3) (1991).
308. Id. § 163.3177(10)(h).
309. Id. § 163.3177(3)(a).
310. Id. § 163.3177(3)(b).
311. Id. §§ 163.3177(6)(a), .3194(1)(a).
312. Id. § 163.3177(6)(b), (c), (e).
313. Section 163.3194(4)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: "It is the intent of this act that the
comprehensive plan set general guidelines and principles concerning its purposes and contents
and that this act shall be construed broadly to accomplish its stated purposes and objectives."
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Chapter 9J-5, which was reviewed and conditionally approved by
the Legislature, provides further support for this contention. Gener-
ally, the minimum criteria rule provides that the local plan must in-
clude "[r]equirements for capital improvements implementation" and
that LOS standards must be established to ensure that adequate facil-
ity capacity "will be provided. 31 4 The minimum criteria for the indi-
vidual facility elements require policies and implementation activities
for providing the facilities needed to correct existing deficiencies and
to serve new development." 5 Perhaps the strongest expression in chap-
ter 9J-5 of the local government's obligation to provide the necessary
facilities is found in the purpose statement for the capital improve-
ments element. As described in the minimum criteria rule, the purpose
of this element is to determine the need for public facilities as identi-
fied in the individual facilities elements, to estimate the cost of the
facilities and evaluate the local government's ability to finance and
construct the improvements, "and to schedule the funding and con-
struction of improvements in a manner necessary to ensure that capi-
tal improvements are provided when required based on needs
identified in the other comprehensive plan elements. '31 6 The specific
criteria for preparation and adoption of the capital improvements ele-
ment also include numerous requirements that the local government
ensure that the necessary facilities will be provided to satisfy the con-
currency requirement. 17
Although the obligation of local governments to provide the ade-
quate public facilities is implicit in the provisions of the 1985 Act and
chapter 9J-5, it might be useful to make the obligation explicit by
amending Florida's growth management legislation. However, the
larger issue is how the obligation can be enforced. For example, what
remedies are available to the landowner if a local government's plan
commits it to provide certain facilities, but the local government de-
faults in its obligation and then denies development permission to a
landowner because the facilities needed to meet concurrency are not
available? Can the landowner be lawfully denied a development per-
mit if the local government does not fulfill its obligation, or should
the local government be compelled to issue the permit so long as the
landowner pays any impact fee or other fair share or proportionate
assessment that has been established in the local jurisdiction? Or can
314. FLA. ADMN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005(1)(c)2., (3) (1990).
315. See, e.g., id. at r. 9J-5.007(2), (3)(c), (transportation); id. at r. 9J-5.011(2)(b)-(c) (sewer,
solid waste, drainage, and potable water).
316. Id. at r. 9J-5.016.
317. See, e.g., id. at 9J-5.016(3)(c)6., (4)(b).
CONCURRENCY
the landowner bring a lawsuit to compel the local government to pro-
vide the facilities? These issues will be explored in Part IV.
6. Paying for Infrastructure
The obligation to provide adequate public facilities cannot be satis-
fied without adequate revenue. As the Ramapo experience illustrates,
a local government's ability to fund its capital improvements program
is critical to the success of adequate public facilities requirements, or
at least those that are intended to accommodate rather than exclude
growth. Consequently, if a state legislature mandates that local gov-
ernments impose and enforce a concurrency requirement, it has a cor-
responding obligation to ensure that adequate revenue is available to
local governments. Florida has not yet satisfactorily fulfilled this re-
sponsibility.
A state-mandated concurrency requirement propels the infrastruc-
ture funding issue to the forefront of public debate.1 8 It forces both
local government and private sector decision makers to address the
problem of paying for growth. Standing alone, however, such a re-
quirement will not solve the problem. Faced with the choice of deny-
ing development or raising taxes to support growth, a local
government may opt for the former rather than incur the wrath of a
citizenry opposed to new taxes. On the other hand, the local govern-
ment may be willing but unable to raise the additional money needed
to accommodate new development because it has already exhausted its
existing revenue sources or because the exercise of its available reve-
nue options must be approved by public referendum. Additionally, if
the infrastructure involved-for example, state highways-is a state
responsibility and the legislature declines to appropriate money for the
expansion or improvement of these facilities, the local government
may have little choice but to limit development in the area. The local
government may also attempt to shift the revenue burden by giving
the developer the choice of having its application for development ap-
proval denied or paying for the infrastructure needed to accommodate
the development. In other words, the absence of adequate and easily
accessible funding sources will lead to "finger pointing" and "buck-
passing" among the state, local governments, developers, and the
public at large.
318. The final report of the State Comprehensive Plan Committee described the concurrency
requirement in the following terms: "This statutory stop sign for growth is a powerful exercise
of the state's power to regulate-and a forceful reminder of the need to pay for the continued
growth of Florida. Our failure to acknowledge this need until now has made this statutory dead-
line necessary." STATE COMPREHENsVnE PLAN CommriTEE, supra note 296, at 23.
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Dramatizing the funding problem without solving it also raises seri-
ous questions about the purposes of concurrency. Enforcement of a
concurrency requirement without adequate mechanisms for the public
funding of infrastructure will either prevent development or shift dis-
proportionately the burden of funding infrastructure to the private de-
veloper. This result may suit those opposed to growth or to paying for
facilities needed to support new development, but it raises difficult
issues of equity and legality. If the requirement is imposed on a sys-
tem with substantial infrastructure backlogs, so that the private devel-
oper is compelled not only to pay the new infrastructure costs created
by its project but also to correct existing deficiencies, the seriousness
of the equitable and legal issues is compounded. The equity issue will
create enormous pressure for legislative repeal of the concurrency re-
quirement if adequate public funding is not provided and will inevita-
bly lead to judicial challenges. Consequently, any responsible
concurrency system must be supported by an adequate funding system
that equitably and legally distributes between the public and private
sectors the cost of both correcting existing infrastructure deficiencies
and providing the additional public facilities and services required by
new development.
The 1985 Florida Legislature recognized that implementation of the
State Comprehensive Plan and the new growth management legisla-
tion would require additional revenue. Accordingly, the Legislature
created the State Comprehensive Plan Committee and directed it to
analyze the ability of the state and local governments to pay for both
existing operations and the future facilities needed to implement the
state plan over the next ten years and to recommend a set of tax and
other financing mechanisms to produce the necessary revenue.1 9 In
1986, before the release of the final report of the State Comprehensive
Plan Committee, the Legislature decided to eliminate sales tax exemp-
tions for services on July 1, 1987, unless new laws were enacted to
maintain the exemptions.3 20 Subsequently, in February 1987, the State
Comprehensive Plan Committee issued its final report, which esti-
mated that approximately $53 billion would be needed to implement
the state plan at the state and local levels over the next ten years. This
total did not include existing infrastructure deficits. The Committee
319. Ch. 85-57, § 3, 1985 Fla. Laws 295, 322-23.
320. STATE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN ComborEE, supra note 296, at 41; ch. 86-166, § 3, 1986
Fla. Laws 816, 819 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)6) (Supp. 1986)) (imposed tax on all serv-
ices); id. § 5, 1986 Fla. Laws at 824 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 212.08 (Supp. 1986)) (repealed
various exemptions to the sales tax). The 1986 legislation also created the Sales Tax Study Com-
mission to recommend to the 1987 Legislature which, if any, of the repealed exemptions should
be retained. Id. § 9, 1986 Fla. Laws at 825.
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recommended a variety of new funding sources, including elimination
of tax exemptions for services as proposed by the 1986 Legislature.32 1
However, after initially approving the sales tax on services with the
support of the Governor, the 1987 Legislature, following great public
opposition to the tax, repealed the services tax pursuant to the Gover-
nor's recommendation. 22 Consequently, the infrastructure funding is-
sue has been a major and continuing controversy throughout the
implementation of Florida's 1985 growth management legislation.
Local governments have complained loudly and with justification
that they lack adequate revenue sources to meet state-imposed growth
management requirements. 23 With the exception of ad valorem taxes,
which are reserved to local governments,3 24 the Florida Constitution
reserves to the State all forms of taxation unless the Legislature dele-
gates the taxing power to local governments by general law.325 Using
this constitutional authorization, the Legislature has enacted approxi-
mately a dozen local option taxes, most of which are applicable in
only a few jurisdictions, only four of which are available in all sixty-
seven counties, and none of which can be exercised by municipalities.
Only three of the local option taxes may be enacted without referen-
dum. 26 Of the four principal local option taxes available to finance
infrastructure, three require approval by referendum, and the fourth
may be submitted to a referendum.3 27 Ironically, the Legislature,
which has imposed the concurrency requirement on local govern-
ments, has severely restricted their ability to comply. Furthermore, by
requiring approval by referendum for the major local option infra-
structure taxes, the Legislature has given tremendous leverage to the
321. STATE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN ComMITTEE, supra note 296, at 41.
322. Ch. 87-6, 1987 Fla. Laws 9 (amended by ch. 87-101, 1987 Fla. Laws 842) (codified at
FLA. STAT. ch. 212) (imposed sales tax on a wide range of personal and professional services);
FLA. H.R. JouR. 4 (Spec. Sess. "D" Dec. 9, 1987), FLA. S. Jotra. 40 (Spec. Sess. "D" Dec. 10,
1987) (repealing the sales tax on services). For an analysis of Florida's brief experience with the
sales tax on services, see Vicki L. Weber, Florida's Fleeting Sales Tax on Services, 15 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 613 (1987).
323. See, e.g., Thomas J. Billitteri, Big-City Mayors: 'We've Had Enough,' FLoRIDA TREND,
Nov. 1989, at 48.
324. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §1(a), 9(a). Ad valorem property taxes are politically difficult to
raise, and they are also subject to a constitutional millage cap. Id. at art. VII, §9(b).
325. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(a).
326. JOINT ADvis. CoUNcIL ON INTERGOVTL. REL., A PROFILE OF FLORIDA MUNICIPAL AND
COUNTY REVENUE 107-08 (1989).
327. Id. The three local option taxes requiring approval at the referendum are the Voted Gas
Tax, see FLA. STAT. § 336.021 (1991); the Charter County Transit System Surtax, see id. §
212.055(1); and the Local Government Infrastructure Surtax, see id. § 212.055(2). The fourth,
the Local Option Gas Tax, see id. § 336.025, may be enacted by a majority vote of the county's
governing board or by referendum. Id. § 336.025(3); JOINT ADvis. COUNCIL ON INTERGOVTL
REL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INFORMATION HANDBOOK 96-123 (1990).
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no-growth forces who can now seek to exclude growth by voting
against badly needed public infrastructure funding.3 2
Shifting this burden to the development community is not consis-
tent with Florida's growth management laws nor is it permissible un-
der court-imposed guidelines. The State Comprehensive Plan
contemplates that the private development community will pay only
the share of infrastructure costs fairly allocated to it on the basis of
benefits received and that state and local governments will shoulder
the remainder of the costs. 329 The provisions of chapter 9J-5 of the
Florida Administrative Code reinforce the principle that developers
may only be assessed a pro rata share of the costs of adequate public
facilities needed to satisfy the concurrency requirement. 30 These statu-
tory and administrative rule provisions reflect the judicially formu-
lated rules that limit the imposition of development impact fees to a
proportionate fair share of new facility needs and prohibit use of
these fees to reduce existing infrastructure deficiencies. 331 Accordingly,
if Florida's local governments are to implement their concurrency sys-
tems consistent with the philosophy, goals, and policies of the state's
growth management laws, the Florida Legislature must provide them
with adequate and easily accessible public revenue sources.
7. The Relationship Between Concurrency and Other State
Planning Goals and Policies
The State Comprehensive Plan contains a broad range of state plan-
ning goals and related policies. Encompassing social, economic, envi-
ronmental, and physical land planning concerns, the twenty-seven
goals are of equal weight and status. The state plan does not rank or
give preferred status to any of the planning goals, including those re-
lating to concurrency. Obviously, these goals may conflict when ap-
plied to particular programs and situations. Consequently, the 1985
Legislature envisioned a balancing process for applying the various
goals: "The plan shall be construed and applied as a whole, and no
specific goal or policy in the plan shall be construed or applied in iso-
lation from the other goals and policies in the plan. ' 33 2
328. In 1989 and 1990 local option discretionary sales surtaxes proposed to help implement
local comprehensive plans were defeated by referendum vote in Alachua, Brevard, Broward,
Charlotte, and Hillsborough counties. LocAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INFORMATION HANDBOOK,
supra note 327, at 124.
329. FLA. STAT. § 187.201(18)(b)3., 4. (1991).
330. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.016(2)(f), (3)(b)4., (3)(c)8. (1990).
331. Seesupranote5l.
332. FLA. STAT. § 187.101(3) (1991).
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This balanced approach has been thwarted by the Legislature's fail-
ure to carefully consider the impact of concurrency on other state
planning goals. Mirroring the statewide planning concerns expressed
in the State Comprehensive Plan, the 1985 Act required each local
comprehensive plan to address a wide array of issues through its fu-
ture land use, capital improvements, housing, transportation, conser-
vation, and other mandatory elements.333 The provision of adequate
public facilities was not accorded any higher status than other plan-
ning concerns, such as the provision of affordable housing, the con-
servation of natural resources, or the creation of rational and efficient
land use patterns. However, the Legislature upset this delicate balance
by prohibiting the issuance of development orders that would result in
a LOS below the standard adopted for a particular public facility
without granting local governments any express statutory authority to
waive this requirement if necessary to achieve other goals. 334 As expe-
rience has shown, a strict, uniform application of the concurrency re-
quirement can prevent the achievement of other state goals and
policies.
DCA recognized early in the local plan compliance review process
that a strict and inflexible application of transportation LOS stan-
dards in urban core areas would work against achievement of state
antisprawl policies. For example, if unreasonably or unrealistically
high LOS standards are set for roads in the urban core where traffic
capacity is already limited and road improvements will be expensive,
new development will be pushed to suburban or undeveloped areas
where traffic capacity is available or can be provided at less cost. Ac-
cordingly, DCA has approved local plans that deviate from the DOT's
established LOS standards for state roads in urban areas so long as
the local government demonstrates that such deviations are part of an
overall strategy to prevent urban sprawl or promote public transit.3
Strict application of the concurrency requirement can also interfere
with achievement of other state planning goals. Requiring the provi-
sion of a range of public facilities that meet minimum performance
standards will undoubtedly increase the cost of housing to both the
333. Seeid. § 163.3177.
334. Id. § 163.3177(10)(h).
335. See, e.g., Department of Community Affairs v. Metropolitan Dade County, Stipulated
Settlement Agreement, Case No. 89-0564GM, Exh. A (DOAH 1989) (authorizing Dade County
to deviate from DOT's LOS standards on state roads in urban infill areas in order to discourage
urban sprawl and promote greater use of mass transit). These exemptions have been based on the
provisions of chapter 9J-5 that require local adherence to state LOS standards for state roads
only "to the maximum extent feasible." FLA. ADwaN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.007(2)(b) (1990); see
supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
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developer and the consumer. The increased costs make the delivery of
affordable housing projects more difficult. Therefore, some similar
programs in other jurisdictions have exempted affordable housing
projects from their adequate public facilities requirements.3 36 In Flor-
ida, however, there is no current statutory or rule basis for exempting
affordable housing from the state-mandated concurrency require-
ment. The Florida Legislature should carefully review the concurrency
concept and its relationship to other equally or more important state
planning goals. If necessary to achieve other state goals such as af-
fordable housing, the Legislature should authorize exemptions from,
or modifications in, the concurrency requirement.
8. The Local System for Monitoring and Enforcing Concurrency
How does Florida enforce the concurrency requirement? Essen-
tially, the State relies on the good faith of local governments and citi-
zen actions to ensure that development permits will not be issued
unless adequate public facilities will be available. Each local govern-
ment must adopt a concurrency management system to monitor and
enforce LOS standards. 3 7 The local system must ensure that adequate
facilities will be available as defined in DCA's concurrency rule. In
addition, the local system must develop guidelines for interpreting and
applying its LOS standards to applications for development approval
and must identify the point in the approval process when the concur-
rency test must be satisfied. DCA's concurrency rule provides that the
last point in the application process for making a concurrency deter-
mination is before the approval of a specific plan of development,
which includes the densities and intensities of the proposed develop-
ment. 338 If adequate facility capacity will not be available, the local
government has a statutory obligation to either deny an application
for development approval or approve it subject to conditions that will
ensure the availability of adequate facilities. 39
336. See, e.g., ANNUAL GROWTH POLICY, supra note 12, at 13, exempting affordable housing
from Montgomery County, Maryland's, adequate public facilities ordinance.
337. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055 (1991). Essentially, a concurrency management
system has four phases: (1) inventories to determine the capacity of existing facilities; (2) a con-
currency assessment or evaluation of each application for development approval that determines
the amount of facility capacity required to serve the development; (3) issuance of development
permits, assuming adequate capacity exists or will be available, and imposition of appropriate
conditions that phase in the development or provide for construction of improvements to public
facilities needed to maintain LOS standards; and (4) annual monitoring and disclosure to the
public of the existing capacity and LOS, including any deficiencies. The Evolution and Require-
ments of the CMS Rule, supra note 282, at 6-9.
338. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055, (2)(e) (1990).
339. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(2)(g) (1991).
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Ultimately, however, if a local government does not meet its obliga-
tion, enforcement of the Florida concurrency requirement is left to
citizen action. After a local plan has been adopted, the State has lim-
ited statutory authority to enforce the concurrency provisions of the
local plan. If the local government fails to adopt concurrency regula-
tions, DCA is empowered to seek a court injunction to compel their
adoption.3 40 If a local government adopts concurrency regulations that
are inconsistent with the concurrency policies of its local plan, a sub-
stantially affected person may challenge the regulations for inconsis-
tency with the local plan in a state administrative hearing following a
preliminary review of the regulations by DCA.3 41 If a local govern-
ment issues a development order that is inconsistent with the local
plan's concurrency provisions, a citizen with standing may file a court
action to invalidate the inconsistent development order or enjoin the
development.142 Only time and experience will tell whether citizen suits
are an effective enforcement mechanism, but at least the State has
provided some remedy for the issuance of development permits that
violate the concurrency requirement. In striking contrast, the growth
management statutes provide no express remedy for the developer
when local government fails to deliver the facilities that it has prom-
ised in its comprehensive plan.
V. OF BROKEN COMMITMENTS, MORATORIA, AND TAKING CLAMS:
THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE LANDOWNER'S REMEDY
Florida's growth management laws address many of the concerns
raised by landowners and others about the Ramapo adequate public
340. Id. § 163.3202(4). Each local government must adopt concurrency regulations within
one year of submitting its proposed comprehensive plan to DCA for compliance review.
Id. § 163.3201(l),(2).
341. Id. § 163.3213. If a local government fails to adopt concurrency regulations, DCA may
institute a court action to compel adoption of these regulations. Id. § 163.3202(4). If a local
government adopts concurrency regulations, any "substantially affected person" has the right to
challenge the consistency of the regulations with the adopted local plan in an administrative
review proceeding. Id. § 163.3213(1), (2)(a). The time requirements and conditions precedent for
initiating such actions are outlined in § 163.3213(3)-(6), Florida Statutes, and chapter 9J-24 of
the Florida Administrative Code. If a state administrative hearing officer enters a final order
determining that the concurrency regulations are inconsistent with the local plan, the Adminis-
tration Commission may impose sanctions. FLA. STAT. § 163.3213(5), (6) (1991). Two consis-
tency challenges have been brought against Collier County's concurrency regulations, but no
final order has been entered in the two cases. See In re: Consistency of Collier County's Ade-
quate Public Facilities Ordinance with its Comprehensive Plan, No. 90-003 LDR (DCA Jan. 22,
1991); In re: Consistency of Collier County's Zoning Reevaluation Ordinance and Adequate
Public Facilities Ordinance with its Comprehensive Plan, No. 90-002 LDR (DCA Dec. 6, 1990).
342. Section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes, provides that an "aggrieved or adversely affected
party" may bring a court action challenging the consistency of a development order with an
adopted local comprehensive plan. There are presently no reported cases involving challenges to
development orders for alleged inconsistency with the concurrency provisions of local plans.
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facilities requirement. If properly implemented, the state, regional,
and local comprehensive planning processes ensure that Florida's local
governments cannot use their concurrency systems for exclusionary
purposes and that they must plan for and accommodate growth with
due consideration for state and regional concerns. Nevertheless, con-
currency systems will still impinge on private property rights, espe-
cially if adequate public facilities are not available to satisfy the
concurrency requirement. Consequently, constitutional challenges to
local concurrency systems based on the Due Process, Equal Protec-
tion, and Taking Clauses are inevitable. 43 These constitutional claims
are likely to disappoint landowners in most cases.
As an exercise of the police power, concurrency and similar regula-
tions are subject only to rationality review under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses. 3" Assuming no fundamental interest is in-
volved, courts traditionally apply the same "means-end" test to both
substantive due process and equal protection challenges to land use
regulations. 45 Under this test, which was applied by the Ramapo
court3" and discussed in Part 11,347 the reviewing court first inquires
whether the regulation has a legitimate public purpose, i.e., the pro-
tection of health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Second, the court
then evaluates whether the regulation is a reasonable means to achieve
this purpose. In the words the Supreme Court chose in Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty,3 48 the land use regulation will not be deemed
violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses unless it is
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 3 49 This standard
of review is highly deferential; the regulation is presumed valid, and if
its reasonableness is fairly debatable, the court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature. 5 0
Given the breadth of the public welfare concept and the deferential
standard of judicial review, successful due process and equal protec-
343. These constitutional provisions are most often cited by developer representatives as the
bases of potential challenges to the concurrency requirement. See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 40,
at 248-50.
344. Kayden, supra note 97, at 302-06.
345. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). If no fundamental right
or support classification is involved, "[slcrutiny under equal protection analysis is essentially
equivalent to scrutiny under due process doctrine." Lockary v. Kayfetz, 908 F.2d 543, 547 (9th
Cir. 1990).
346. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 301 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
347. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
348. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
349. Id. at 395.
350. Kayden, supra note 97, at 308-09.
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tion claims against concurrency systems are likely to be a rare occur-
rence. The concept of the public welfare, which loosely constrains
exercise of the police power, encompasses an exceedingly broad range
of public purposes."' Courts have held that such health, safety, and
aesthetic objectives as controlling the rate and character of commu-
nity growth; avoiding the problems caused by uncontrolled and rapid
growth, such as traffic congestion, noise, and declining quality of life;
preventing urban sprawl; preserving rural environments; and ensuring
adequate provision of services and orderly development, are legitimate
public purposes. 52 A concurrency system has many of these objec-
tives, 353 and timing development to occur with the provision of facili-
ties and services is a reasonable means of achieving them. Therefore,
unless tainted by some totally irrational design feature, the system is
likely to withstand scrutiny under classic due process-equal protection
analysis.354
Taking claims are more complicated than due process-equal protec-
tion cases and are equally problematic for landowner relief. The prin-
cipal policy of the Taking or Just Compensation Clause is "to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
351. Land use regulations "must find their justification in some aspect of the police power,
asserted for the public welfare." Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. As described by the Supreme Court in
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), "[tjhe concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." (citations
omitted); accord Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
352. See, e.g., Boraas, 416 U.S. at 9, 13-14 (preservation of quiet, healthy community char-
acter and reducing traffic congestion); Smithfield Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town
of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 245 (Ist Cir. 1990) (reducing traffic congestion); Construction In-
dus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) (preservation of small town
character and avoidance of the social and environmental problems caused by an uncontrolled
growth rate); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974) (preservation
of rural environment); Guiliano v. Town of Edgarton, 531 F. Supp. 1076, 1080-85 (D. Mass.
1982) (ensuring adequate provision of municipal services and orderly development); Dateline
Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 194 Cal. Rptr. 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (preventing urban
sprawl and proliferation of fragmented sewer systems); see also Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ra-
mapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 307 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (describing legitimate
public purposes for land use regulation).
353. Freilich & White, supra note 1, at 951-52.
354. Id. at 952-55. Katherine E. Stone & Philip A. Seymour, Regulating the Timing of De-
velopment: Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Challenges to Growth Control Regula-
tions, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1205, 1224-29 (1991). For a case involving an improper design
requirement, see Begin v. Town of Sabattus, 409 A.2d 1269, 1276 (Me. 1979) (invalidating local
growth control measure on equal protection grounds because its discriminatory treatment of
manufactured housing construction was not rationally related to alleviating traffic congestion
and demand on public services).
1034 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:973
whole. ' 355 Determining when governmental action violates this policy
can be difficult and confusing because the Supreme Court has not de-
veloped any "set formula" for deciding taking claims.3"6 Three lines
of authority have emerged for making this determination. The first
line of authority is clear, unequivocal, and easily applied: If govern-
mental action results in "[a] permanent physical occupation" of pri-
vate property, a per se taking occurs to the extent of the occupation,
"without regard to whether the action achieves an important public
benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner. ' 357 Of
very recent origin, a second line of authority emanating from Agins v.
City of Tiburon358 establishes a two-pronged disjunctive test: a land
use regulation constitutes a taking if it "does not substantially ad-
vance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically via-
ble use of his land."35 9 The "substantially advanc[ing]" prong has
generally been considered identical to traditional due process-equal
protection analysis. 36 In lieu of a disjunctive test, the third line of
authority, which crystallized in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City,36' uses an ad hoc, factual inquiry that focuses on the
particular facts of each case and that evaluates factors such as the
regulation's economic impact, its interference with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations, and its nature or character. 362
To this already complex jurisprudential stew, the Supreme Court
added more ingredients in 1987. In First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles,3 63 the Court reaffirmed that a land
use regulation may go so far as to effectuate a taking and recognized
the concept of temporary regulatory takings 64 Even more important,
the Court held that if a regulation does rise to the level of a taking,
invalidation of the ordinance is not a sufficient remedy, although it
does render the taking a temporary-rather than a permanent-depri-
vation of property rights. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
355. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), quoted in Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
356. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
357. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432-33 n.9, 434-35
(1982).
358. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
359. Id. at 260 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
360. Id.
361. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
362. Id. at 124; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495
(1987).
363. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
364. Id. at 311-12.
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Amendment, requires compensation "for the period during which the
taking was effective.''365 Significantly, however, the Court did not
modify its previously enunciated taking tests or decide whether the
regulation in question constituted a taking.36 Furthermore, it held
that preliminary activities leading up to adoption of a regulation do
not constitute a taking and expressly refrained from addressing issues
arising from "normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before us. ' 367
After thickening the taking stew with First English, the Court then
tossed Nollan v. California Coastal Commission36 into the pot. In
Nollan, the Court reviewed a coastal construction permit conditioned
on the provision by the Nollans of a ten-foot-wide lateral access ease-
ment allowing the public to traverse the private beach on their ocean-
front lot. 69 The Court characterized the access easement as a
"permanent physical occupation" of private property.3 70 Thus, under
the line of authority previously mentioned, if the Nollans had not
been seeking a permit, requiring them to convey the easement without
compensation clearly would have violated the Taking Clause. 371 How-
ever, because a land use regulation was involved, the Court referred to
the second line of authority and focused on the first prong of the Eu-
clid-derived Agins test: specifically, does the regulation "substantially
advance legitimate state interests?"372 Applying this "means-ends"
analysis, the Court assumed, without deciding, that the Coastal Com-
mission's alleged purpose of protecting the public's visual access to
the beach was legitimate.373 The Court then stated that the permit con-
dition must substantially advance that purpose, a relationship which
the Court characterized as an "essential nexus."3 74 Concluding that
the lateral access easement totally failed to advance that purpose, the
Court held that the permit condition constituted a taking without just
compensation.3 75
365. Id. at 321.
366. Id. at 313.
367. Id. at 321.
368. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
369. Id. at 831.
370. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (quoting Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432-33 n.9 (1982)).
371. See supra text accompanying note 357. In Nollan the Court stated: "We have repeat-
edly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, 'the right to exclude [others
is] "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property." 483 U.S. at 831 (citations omitted) (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434).
372. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
373. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835.
374. Id. at 837.
375. Id. at 837-39.
1992] 1035
1036 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:973
Standing alone, this analysis and holding would have contributed
meat but little zest to the ever-simmering stew of taking decisions.
However, in dictum, Justice Scalia, writing for the Nollan majority,
provided the spice. Although he applied the Agins "substantially ad-
vancing" test, which is directly traceable to the "substantial rela-
tion," due process-equal protection test of Euclid,376 Justice Scalia
concluded in a footnote that the relationship between "means and
ends" in taking claims has always required greater scrutiny than in
due process and equal protection cases. 377 Although Justice Scalia's
contention has provoked much debate and disagreement about its ac-
curacy and import, 37 Nollan provides new ammunition for those who
seek heightened judicial scrutiny of land use regulations.
Local concurrency systems may result in delays in obtaining devel-
opment approval for some projects, building moratoria for some ar-
eas, and attempts to exact even greater infrastructure payments from
developers. Brandishing their new First English and Nollan weaponry,
landowners and developers are likely to claim that such delays, mora-
toria, and exactions deny them due process and equal protection of
the law or constitute temporary takings of their property without just
compensation. However, with the limited exception of exactions,
which will be discussed momentarily, the challengers may find that
they are firing blanks or that the local comprehensive plan provides an
effective shield against their constitutional artillery.
First English does not stand for the proposition that a temporary
delay in the right to develop property automatically constitutes a tem-
porary taking. As mentioned above, the Court in First English did not
modify its previously adopted tests for determining the taking issue.
Under those tests, courts have frequently held that a temporary, as
376. Id. at 834-35. "we have long recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a tak-
ing if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land,"' Id. at 834 (citation omitted) (quoting Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). For an excellent analysis of Nollan that traces the Agins test
employed in Nollan to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., see Kayden, supra note 97, at
313-16.
377. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35 n.3.
As indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridgment of property rights
through the police power as a 'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate state interest.
We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual convey-
ance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in
that context there is a heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensa-
tion requirement, rather than the stated police power objective.
Id. at 841.
378. See, e.g., Kayden, supra note 97; Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1600, 1608-14 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT.
REv. 1. 42-43.
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opposed to a permanent, restriction on the use of property does not
constitute a taking. Recall that the Ramapo court determined that a
restriction on development of up to as much as eighteen years was
temporary and therefore not a taking. 79 Further, on remand in the
First English case, the California Court of Appeal held that the in-
terim regulation prohibiting construction in the flood plain did not
constitute a taking even though it had been in effect for eight years.8 0
According to the California court, First English does not convert
"moratoriums and other interim land use restrictions into unconstitu-
tional 'temporary takings' requiring compensation unless, perhaps, if
these interim measures are unreasonable in purpose, duration or
scope." 3"' Some commentators interpret Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,38 2 decided the same year as First English and
Penn Central, to mean that deprivation of present use will not neces-
sarily constitute a taking if future use remains. 83 Arguably, then,
when temporary restrictions are involved, the appropriate question
should be whether there will be "a reasonable use of property meas-
ured over a reasonable period of time. 38 4 Consequently, the tempo-
rary taking doctrine of First English will probably afford much less
relief from temporary, concurrency-induced moratoria than it might
appear to offer at first glance.
The strong comprehensive planning foundation on which concur-
rency is grounded will also diminish the chances for relief based on
taking and other constitutional grounds. A comprehensive plan pre-
pared and adopted under Florida's growth management laws will help
to insulate concurrency regulations from constitutional attacks in sev-
eral ways. First, because it provides "a solid scientific, statistical ba-
sis" for the regulations,3 5 the comprehensive plan will help to refute
379. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 303 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
380. 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
381. Id.
382. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
383. See, e.g., Linda Bozung & Deborah J. Alessi, Recent Developments in Environmental
Preservation and the Rights of Property Owners, 20 URw. LAW. 969, 1017 (1988). This interpre-
tation is based on the nonsegmentation theory enunciated by the Court in Penn Central: "'Tak-
ing' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated." Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). The Court reiterated this concept in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
384. Bozung & Alessi, supra note 383, at 1017.
385. Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394 A.2d 847, 849 (N.H. 1978) (quoting Patenaude v.
Town of Meredith, 392 A.2d 582, 585 (N.H. 1978)). In declaring invalid the town's "low
growth" ordinance because it had not been adopted in accordance with the state's comprehen-
sive planning and zoning legislation, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated: "Comprehen-
sive planning with a solid scientific, statistical basis is the key element in land use regulation in
New Hampshire." Id.
1992] 1037
1038 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:973
charges of arbitrariness and irrationality. Second, as a document dem-
onstrating that the local government proposes to accommodate its
projected growth in a balanced and well-planned manner, the compre-
hensive plan will constitute persuasive evidence that the concurrency
system is not tainted by exclusionary motives or efforts. Third,
through its goals, policies, and objectives, which must be consistent
with the goals and policies of the legislatively enacted state growth
management laws, the comprehensive plan establishes the legitimate
public purposes of the concurrency system. Fourth, with its capital
improvements program for addressing both existing infrastructure de-
ficiencies and estimated future needs, the comprehensive plan repre-
sents the local government's good faith intent and efforts to provide
the facilities and services needed to accommodate growth. It also con-
stitutes evidence that the landowner will be able to develop in the fu-
ture when facilities are eventually provided. For these various reasons,
courts have frequently cited a comprehensive plan or planning process
in rejecting constitutional attacks against growth controls and other
land use regulations .1 6
A few hypotheticals will illustrate the difficulty which constitutional
claims against applications of the concurrency requirement will en-
counter. Consider first the situation, as in Ramapo, where land in ur-
ban fringe or rural areas is not programmed to receive the public
facilities and services necessary to satisfy concurrency immediately or
even in the foreseeable future. Suppose, for example, that pursuant to
its state-approved local comprehensive plan, which is designed to cur-
tail urban sprawl, a local government decides not to provide public
facilities-under either its short-term or long-term capital improve-
ments plan- 38 7 to support urban type development on land outside its
designated urban services area. Finding it financially unfeasible to
provide all of the facilities and services necessary to satisfy concur-
rency, a landowner who desires to develop outside the urban services
area brings suit to invalidate the concurrency requirement or compel
386. See, e.g., Wincamp Partnership v. Anne Arundel County, Md., 458 F. Supp. 1009 (D.
Md. 1978) (rejecting substantive due process and takings claims and citing county's ongoing
planning activities); Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp.
1369, 1382-85, 1388-90 (D. Md. 1975) (rejecting substantive due process and takings claims and
citing ongoing comprehensive planning activities for infrastructure); Dateline Builders, Inc. v.
City of Santa Rosa, 194 Cal. Rptr. 258 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting substantive due
process claim and citing local comprehensive plan); see also supra notes 167-71 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the emphasis the Ramapo court gave to the local comprehensive plan in
rejecting substantive due process and takings claims).
387. See supra text accompanying notes 231-32.
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the local government to provide the necessary facilities and services88
Will the landowner win?
Assuming the local plan and its application are otherwise reasona-
ble and defensible, 89 the concurrency requirement should withstand
such attacks. The Ramapo decision itself is persuasive authority for
the validity of this planning strategy, especially if the local plan per-
mits the landowner to meet concurrency by providing the necessary
facilities.319 Cases like Dateline Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa
provide additional support. 91 In Dateline Builders, the comprehensive
plan adopted by both the City and Sonoma County incorporated a
compact land use and development policy to prevent urban sprawl.
Among other goals, this policy was intended to curb the proliferation
of fragmented sewer systems by extending utilities in an economically
efficient manner and "in accordance with orderly development in-
stead of urban sprawl."3 92 The builders proposed to develop a "leap-
frog" housing project in an agricultural area beyond the municipal
boundaries and requested permission to connect the project to the Ci-
ty's existing sewer trunk line. After the City refused to permit the con-
nection even though it had adequate sewer capacity, the builders
sought a court order compelling the City to permit the connection.
Applying the traditional due process and equal protection rationality
test, the court upheld the City's refusal to provide the service on the
ground that the proposed development was inconsistent with the Ci-
388. This hypothetical assumes that the local plan designates the land for the uses that the
landowner proposes to undertake as in the Ramapo plan. Of course, this problem may be
avoided by designating the land for nonurban, rural type uses.
389. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(4)(a) (1991).
390. See supra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
391. 194 Cal. Rptr. 258 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
392. Id. at 261 (emphasis omitted). According to the court, the city and county plan had the
following goals:
(I) to encourage a compact growth pattern and discourage inefficient sprawl through
out the planning area; (2) to provide safe convenient traffic ways linking living areas
with shopping and employment centers and recreation areas; (3) to further develop the
public utility system in a manner to serve the growing metropolitan area most eco-
nomically and efficiently; (4) to schedule utility extensions in a manner to help insure
compact, efficient growth patterns with maximum economy; and (5) to encourage co-
operation between all governmental agencies responsible for development occurring in
the planning area.
Id. The court also made the following observation:
Unfortunately, the experience of many communities in this state has been that when
planning is left to developers, the result is urban sprawl. The City's express and reiter-
ated reason for denying the certificate was that Builders' proposed development vio-
lated its policy of orderly compact development from the urban core, and would result
in a "leap-frog" development and "urban sprawl." A municipality cannot be forced
to take a stake in the developer's success in the area.
Id. at 265.
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ty's and County's adopted policy of compact development, which is a
legitimate public purpose.3 93
Under a properly devised local comprehensive plan, courts may re-
ject constitutional challenges even if the local plan does not permit the
landowner to obtain development approval by providing its own facil-
ities. Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petalunza3 94 involved
such a growth management plan. The Petaluma plan imposed an an-
nual limit of 500 residential units that could be constructed in housing
projects of more than four units. These 500 units were to be allocated
in accordance with a point system based on the availability of public
facilities and services and other land use criteria that allowed the City
to deny development approval even when facilities and services were
available. 95 Especially relevant to the hypothetical situation posed
here, the plan also established an urban service area beyond which the
City would not provide services for at least fifteen years.39 Unlike the
Ramapo plan, the Petaluma plan contained no guarantee of ultimate
development approval within a definite time period and designated ar-
eas in which the City would provide no services at all. Nevertheless,
the court, in rejecting due process and other constitutional attacks on
the plan, held that the City's planning goals of preserving its "small
town character" and avoiding "the social and environmental prob-
lems caused by an uncontrolled growth rate" were legitimate police
power objectives. 97 Under this rationale, as long as the landowner is
allowed any reasonable use, whether present or future, the local plan
may be able to prohibit the use of private systems pending future gov-
ernmental provision of public facilities and services.3 98
Should there be a different result if development moratoria occur in
areas for which the local plan has committed to provide the necessary
393. Id. at 260. The court strongly intimated that the result might have been different in the
absence of a previously adopted comprehensive plan. Id. at 266.
394. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
395. Id. at 900-01.
396. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 576 (N.D. Cal.
1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
397. 522 F.2d at 906-09. The court stated that while "the Plan may frustrate some legitimate
regional housing needs, the Plan is not arbitrary or unreasonable." Id. at 908.
398. See also Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 400 F. Supp
1369 (D. Md. 1975) (rejecting constitutional attacks on a county comprehensive plan prohibition
on the use of private sewer systems in areas where the local government was not scheduled to
provide public facilities in the foreseeable future). Id. at 1382, 1386, 1390. The court held that
the prohibition was a reasonable means of achieving the legitimate public purpose of staging
development and guiding growth in an environmentally efficient manner pursuant to the county
comprehensive plan. Id. at 1391-92. The court stated that if it invalidated the restrictions on the
use of private systems, "then private development would be permitted to build new communities
at random throughout the county, irrespective of the engineering, environmental, and economic
inefficiencies occasioned by haphazard, unplanned growth." Id. at 1392.
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facilities and services? To illustrate, assume that a development com-
pany owns land designated under the local plan for medium-density
residential use so long as public sewer and water are available. After
completing preliminary planning activities for a large residential sub-
division, the company seeks site plan approval and a certificate of
concurrency compliance. Suppose that the concurrency certificate is
denied because of inadequate sewer capacity, because, although the
capital improvements element of the local plan had originally sched-
uled delivery of the necessary public sewerage facilities during the next
fiscal year, the local government will not be able to meet this commit-
ment because of unforeseen circumstances. Furthermore, suppose that
the local planning department informs the company that although re-
vised plans are being developed to provide the facilities, it may be two
or three years or even longer before wastewater facilities are available
for this area. Can the development company get relief through a con-
stitutional attack on the de facto moratorium?
Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission399
suggests that in the absence of unique circumstances, the development
company is unlikely to prevail. In Smoke Rise, homebuilders chal-
lenged various moratoria on public sewer connections that had been in
effect for five years. Rejecting the homebuilders' substantive due
process and taking claims, the court upheld the moratoria.4 Applying
traditional due process analysis, the court found that the moratoria
were reasonable as to both purpose and duration. 401 The moratoria
were enacted for the legitimate public purpose of preventing pollution
of the state's waters by inadequate sewage treatment plants.40 2 The
five-year duration was deemed reasonable in view of the sewer prob-
lem's complexity and interjurisdictional nature. 403
The court rejected the takings claim for two primary reasons. First,
the sewer moratoria were imposed to prevent a public harm to the
waters of the state and not to create a public benefit; hence the mora-
toria were an exercise of the police power and not of the eminent do-
main power. Second, the moratoria created only temporary, not
permanent, restrictions. According to the court, because the home-
builders would be in "an advantageous position to reap high profits"
399. 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975).
400. Id. at 1382, 1386, 1390.
401. Id. at 1383-90.
402. Id. at 1383 ("The legitimacy of the state's purpose in protecting its waters from con-
tamination by sewage overflows requires little discussion.").
403. Id. at 1383-90. The court noted that a moratorium on development must be limited to a
reasonable duration, but that the reasonableness of the duration must be measured by the scope
of the problem. Id. at 1386.
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once the moratoria were lifted, their property had not been rendered
so useless as to effectuate a taking.4°4
Reminiscent of Ramapo, the Smoke Rise court placed great weight
on comprehensive planning. 405 It cited the local government's good
faith, ongoing planning activities, and its extensive and detailed sewer
plans as a basis for upholding the reasonableness of the moratoria's
five-year duration and for finding that the moratoria were not enacted
to improperly exclude growth and development. 4°6 Although it made
no express reference to the local plan in its disposition of the taking
claim, the court was clearly influenced by the existence of the ongoing
planning activities when it found that the moratoria created only a
temporary restriction.
Let us alter the facts of our hypothetical scenario. The development
company owns land on a major arterial road that is designated by the
local comprehensive plan and the implementing zoning code for com-
mercial use. The local plan has established traffic level-of-service "D"
for the road; the capital improvements element has programmed road
and other traffic-related improvements for the area, which if timely
completed will maintain the "D" level of service through the pro-
jected development of the area. 407 Suppose that after the company ap-
plies for site plan approval and a certificate of concurrency
compliance for its proposed retail shopping complex, the local plan-
ning department informs the company that it will recommend denial
of the application unless the company is willing to pay several million
dollars for traffic-related improvements over and above the local traf-
fic impact fee assessment. The basis for this recommendation will be
that there is inadequate road capacity to accommodate the projected
automobile trips generated by the proposed project because the exist-
ing level of service has already fallen to "E." Upon further investiga-
tion, the company discovers that because of unforeseen budgetary
404. Id. at 1383.
405. "The comprehensive plan is the tool whereby design and rationality can replace the
chaotic sprawl which has too often characterized metropolitan development." Id. at 1379.
406. Id. at 1384-85, 1388-89. The court's consideration of the reasonableness of the purpose
and duration of the moratoria and its emphasis on the role of comprehensive planning is consis-
tent with the approach taken by most courts. See, e.g., Schafer v. City of New Orleans, 743 F.2d
1086 (5th Cir. 1984); Wincamp Partnership v. Anne Arundel County, Md., 458 F. Supp. 1009
(D. Md. 1978); Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. 1976); Deal Gar-
dens, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Loch Arbour, 226 A.2d 607 (N.J. 1967).
407. Roadway levels of service (LOS) are rated on a scale from "A" to "F", with "A"
representing the highest LOS (free-flow conditions) and "F" the lowest (extreme congestion or
gridlock). CENTER FOR URBAN TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH, ROADWAY LEvEL-oF-SERvIca DETER-
MINATION 5-7 (1991). For a concise explanation of how roadway LOS is defined, see Freilich &
White, supra note 1, at 942-43.
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problems the local government has failed to make certain road im-
provements for the area that were programmed under the local plan.
Moreover, the company is informed that it is possible that these im-
provements will not be made for at least three years unless the com-
pany pays for them. After the Company declines to pay for the
improvements necessary to restore a "D" level of service and accom-
modate its proposed project, the company's application is officially
denied. Will the Company's constitutional claims fare any better un-
der this scenario?
This situation presents the exaction issue mentioned earlier. The lo-
cal government is attempting to exact from the development company
the funds needed both to eliminate existing traffic deficiencies and
mitigate the impacts of its own project. A recent California case, Mar-
blehead v. City of San Clemente,4°8 involved a voter-approved initia-
tive that established an adequate public facilities requirement and
conditioned development approval on the achievement and mainte-
nance of designated LOS standards for traffic and other facilities. The
trial court interpreted the initiative as requiring the property owner, as
a condition of development approval, to mitigate the impact of his
development and improve existing levels of service. 40 Citing Nollan,
the court upheld the property owner's contention that the initiative
requirement violated the federal Taking and Equal Protection
Clauses. According to the court, the requirement to improve existing
levels of services lacked the substantial nexus required by the Nollan
decision.410
408. No. X-55-1182 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 277 Cal. Rptr.
550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
409. Id. at 1-4.
The Initiative is facially defective. Its plain meaning requires property owners to miti-
gate conditions not only caused by their development (a proper goal) but also to cure
the inadequacies of those who developed their property before them. It is the latter
requirement of improvement of the existing levels of service that fails the nexus test.
Would it be proper to require the last parcel of land to be developed to bear the entire
expense of all the arterial highways, all the police and fire response times, all the one
hundred year flood control, all the animal migration corridors, all the aesthetic cones
of vision, and/or all the park/recreational facilities which have been neglected by
prior city councils and real property owners?
Id. at 4-5.
410. Id. The court stated: "The Nollan nexus analysis requires a direct connection between
the burden imposed by the regulatory condition and the benefit received by the property
owner." Id. at 4. However, the court also observed that this was a requirement of California law
even before the Nollan decision. Id. at 5. Florida law also required such a nexus before Nollan.
See, e.g., Contractors and Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979). Two other California trial courts invalidated similar initiative meas-
ures for the same reasons. McGavran v. City of Costa Mesa, No. 58-3796 (Cal. Super. Ct. June
7, 1989); Kaiser Dev. v. City of San Juan Capistrano, No. 57-7043 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 10,
1989).
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Under this analysis, the development company can avoid payment
of the exaction for existing deficiencies. However, if the local govern-
ment abandons this part of the exactions policy and still denies devel-
opment approval until it can make the traffic improvements required
to achieve the established level of service, where does this leave the
developer? The local government may take an even longer period of
time to make the necessary traffic improvements notwithstanding the
commitments in its local comprehensive plan. Consequently, the de-
velopment company's project will be "temporarily" delayed for sev-
eral years. However, any due process or taking claim will be
considered in light of the purpose and duration of the delay, the tem-
porary nature of the restriction on use, the scope and complexity of
the problem, and the local government's good faith planning efforts
to correct the problem. Accordingly, the development company's
chances of success are problematic at best.
Because of Florida's growth management requirements, especially
the concurrency requirement, a local comprehensive plan imposes sub-
stantial restrictions on the use of property. As the foregoing discus-
sion indicates, except in truly egregious cases, constitutional attacks
on these restrictions will bring little relief for landowners, in part be-
cause of the comprehensive plan that imposes the restrictions. It
would be both ironic and unfair if a local government that uses its
comprehensive plan as a shield against constitutional challenges to
concurrency restrictions could also avoid any liability or accountabil-
ity for failing to fulfill the very funding commitments on which its
plan is based. Invalidation of the concurrency restriction, as some
courts have suggested, is not a desirable remedy because it would de-
feat the public purposes for which the concurrency requirement is im-
posed. Thus, should not the landowner be allowed to enforce the local
government's statutory obligation to provide the facilities and services
in accordance with its adopted local plan, even though the govern-
mental breach of the obligation has not risen to the level of a constitu-
tional violation?
Traditionally, as discussed in Part II, local government utility prov-
iders have been held to a duty to anticipate and satisfy future demand
for their services. A classic statement of this duty is found in Reid
Development Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township:4"
A public water company [here the Township] is under a duty as a
public utility to supply water to all inhabitants of the community
who apply for the service and tender the usual rates. The obligation
411. 89 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1952).
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includes the establishment of a distributive plant adequate to serve
the needs of the municipality and the enlargement of the system to
meet the reasonable demands of the growing community. The utility
is under a duty to serve all within the area who comply with fair and
just rules and regulations applicable to all alike. The obligation is
enforceable by mandamus. 412
Under the traditional rule, local governments could not refuse to pro-
vide services for nonutility-related reasons such as "growth control
and land use planning considerations. ' 413 One commentator has se-
verely criticized this rule because it does not take into consideration
that a local government, unlike a privately owned utility company,
possesses and exercises the police power, which is much broader than
the powers accompanying a utility franchise.4 4 As reflected in such
decisions as Ramapo and Dateline Builders, a modern rule has
evolved that recognizes that a local government may refuse to provide
services to areas that are not programmed to receive them under the
local comprehensive plan. The modern rule is essential if local govern-
ments are to effectively use their police powers to plan and regulate
for the public welfare. Conversely, if local plans are to be meaningful
and fair, the traditional rule should remain in effect and enforceable
in areas in which the local government has committed to provide facil-
ities and services under its plan. Consequently, a developer should
have the right to enforce the plan commitments through court actions
for injunctive relief and compensatory damages.
The courts that have considered the possibility of such actions usu-
ally have avoided the issue or reacted with caution. For example, in
Ramapo the court vaguely hinted at remedial measures if the Town
did not fulfill its obligations but the court specifically mentioned only
invalidation of restrictions that become "absolute prohibitions. '41 5
The court in Smoke Rise, without elaboration, stated that if, after
imposing the sewer moratorium, the local government failed to cor-
rect the sewerage problem "with dispatch," the property owner could
bring suit to compel remedial action as well as for damages. 41 6 Faced
with similar circumstances, the same court, in Wincamp Partnership
412. Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
413. Robinson v. City of Boulder, 547 P.2d 228, 229 (Colo. 1976), overruled by Board of
County Comm'rs of Arapahoe County v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 718 P.2d 235 (Colo.
1986).
414. See Deutsch, supra note 1.
415. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291, 298-99 n.7 (N.Y.), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
416. Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitation Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369,
1386 (D. Md. 1975).
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v. Anne Arundel County,4 17 considered an action for monetary dam-
ages and an injunction directing state and local governmental entities
"to devise a detailed plan and timetable for the prompt provision of
sewage service to plaintiffs' property. ' 418 Finding no contractual or
statutory basis for the claim, the court denied the action.' 9 In Charles
v. Diamond,42 ° the New York Court of Appeals expressed its sympa-
thy for claims of unreasonable governmental delay in a statement that
succinctly summarizes the crux of the problem:
[W]here the municipality has affirmatively barred substantially all
use of private property pending remedial municipal improvements,
unreasonable and dilatory tactics, targeted really to frustrate all
private use of property, are not justified. The municipality may not,
by withholding the improvements that the municipality has made the
necessary prerequisites for development, achieve the result of barring
development, a goal that would perhaps be otherwise unreachable.
Development may not be zoned out of a community by the
indirection of needless municipal delay in providing the essentials for
construction. 42'
Nevertheless, the court declined to recognize an action for consequen-
tial damages caused by the local government's delay.4 22 It should be
noted, however, that none of these cases occurred under a regime of
state comprehensive planning legislation such as Florida's, which
clearly imposes an obligation on local government to plan for and
timely provide the public facilities and services needed to accommo-
date development.
Florida courts should recognize a landowner's cause of action for
injunctive relief, and for damages where appropriate, to enforce local
plan commitments to provide the facilities and services necessary to
satisfy concurrency. A landowner can compel issuance of a develop-
ment order that is consistent with the local plan.423 Similarly, the land-
owner should be entitled to compel provision of facilities and services
for an otherwise permissible development that may be unreasonably
417. 458 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1978).
418. Id. at 1015-16.
419. Id. at 1031.
420. 360 N.E.2d 1295 (N.Y. 1977).
421. Id. at 1301 (citations omitted).
422. Id. at 1304-05 (1977). The court refused to consider whether a temporary regulatory
taking had occurred.
423. See Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 3057
(Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (reversing the county commission's denial of a rezoning that was deter-
mined by the court to be consistent with the county's comprehensive plan).
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delayed for concurrency reasons because of the local government's
failure to deliver the facilities in accordance with its plan. In appropri-
ate cases a court could order the local government to adopt and imple-
ment a new plan to provide the necessary facilities within a specified
period of time and could also award damages if warranted by the
facts, such as in situations involving gross neglect or bad faith. The
local government could present evidence of circumstances beyond its
control and other mitigating factors as defenses which should be
closely scrutinized by the courts. Alternatively, the Florida Legislature
could provide statutory guidelines and parameters under which local
governments may impose concurrency-related moratoria or which
govern actions against the local government for injunctive and mone-
tary relief. For example, the local government could be required to
certify the reasons for any moratoria and to adopt a judicially en-
forceable plan to correct the deficiencies necessitating the moratoria.
Recognition of this landowner's remedy would have several salutary
effects. First, it would underscore local government's obligation to
provide the facilities and services needed to satisfy concurrency. Sec-
ond, it would provide a potent incentive to meet this obligation and a
deterrent to abuses of the concurrency requirement. Third, it would
furnish local governing bodies with a persuasive explanation for their
constituents as to why local governments must fund and implement
their local plans. Fourth, it would promote greater stability and relia-
bility in the local planning process for the development community,
thereby offsetting to some extent the plan's considerable restrictions
on the use of private property. In sum, it would reinforce and enhance
the status of the local comprehensive plan as a truly balanced and
comprehensive constitution for land use planning and regulation that
creates corresponding rights and responsibilities for both the public
and private sectors.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The adequate public facilities requirement is becoming the most
popular land use control in rapidly growing urban areas. A technique
for controlling the timing and sequencing of development through the
coordinated use of local government's fiscal and police powers, the
requirement prohibits the granting of development approvals unless
adequate public facilities are available to accommodate the develop-
ment. However, the requirement is legitimately used only if it is based
on a comprehensive planning and capital improvement programming
system for providing the necessary public facilities. Although the ade-
quate public facilities requirement engenders fears of development
moratoria, it is actually a means of avoiding the necessity for morato-
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ria. Development moratoria are customarily imposed because of inad-
equate facilities. The purpose of a properly designed and implemented
adequate public facilities requirement is to ensure that infrastructure
is available when needed for development.
In 1972 the adequate public facilities requirement was judicially
sanctioned in the landmark case of Golden v. Planning Board of Ra-
mapo.424 The New York Court of Appeals upheld Ramapo's plan for
coordinating development approval with the availability of adequate
public facilities and rejected contentions that the Ramapo system was
exclusionary, indifferent to regional concerns, and unduly restrictive
of private property rights. Critics claimed the plan was an exclusion-
ary, fiscal zoning device that promoted commercial uses at the ex-
pense of low- and moderate-income housing, perpetuated existing
patterns of low-density residential sprawl, and unfairly shifted the
burden of providing public facilities to the private sector. In retro-
spect, the critics also should have questioned the financial feasibility
of the plan.
Florida's growth management laws establish state guidelines to en-
sure that local governments adequately address the criticisms and con-
cerns raised about the use of adequate public facilities requirements.
Each local concurrency system is based on an integrated state, re-
gional, and local comprehensive planning process. The mandatory lo-
cal comprehensive plan, which must incorporate a concurrency system
for managing growth, must also be consistent with state and regional
planning goals and policies. Local plans cannot be exclusionary. To
be consistent with these goals and policies, the local plan must accom-
modate the jurisdiction's projected growth and provide adequate
housing for all income groups, especially low- and moderate-income
persons. The local government has an obligation to provide the facili-
ties needed to serve its projected growth, and this obligation must be
reflected in the local plan's financially feasible capital improvements
element, which indicates when and where the facilities will be pro-
vided. Finally, the provision of public facilities must be coordinated
with a future land use plan that is designed to prevent the various
forms of urban sprawl. To ensure that the local government complies
with these requirements, the Department of Community Affairs, as
the state land planning agency, must review and approve the local
comprehensive plan.
Nevertheless, Florida's state-mandated concurrency system still has
imperfections resulting from the Legislature's failure to consider and
424. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See supra notes 76-113
and accompanying text.
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address a number of fundamental issues. In the absence of adequate
statutory guidance, DCA has struggled valiantly with these issues, but
the Legislature is the proper body to resolve the question of which
public facilities should be subject to the concurrency requirement. Al-
though the development process arguably should not be encumbered
by applying the concurrency requirement to nonphysical, "social" in-
frastructure, the Legislature should consider how this omission affects
local planning and funding for social and human services. The Legis-
lature should also provide adequate guidelines for establishing stan-
dards for determining the adequacy and availability of the facilities
and services subject to concurrency. One solution is to set minimum
state standards for facilities vital to public health and safety, such as
water, sewer, solid waste, and drainage, while giving local govern-
ments broad discretion in setting standards for facilities that are mat-
ters of public convenience or "quality of life," such as parks and
recreation, libraries, and transportation (except possibly state facili-
ties).
"Health and safety" facilities should be in place when development
is ready for use, but longer-term plans for providing less essential fa-
cilities might be acceptable if financial commitments for providing
them are made at the time of development approval. In order to avoid
successful constitutional challenges to the concurrency system, the
Legislature should draw a clearer distinction between the elimination
of existing infrastructure deficiencies and the provision of new facili-
ties and services required by new development. More time should be
given to cure existing deficiencies, especially in the area of transporta-
tion, unless the facility deficiency is creating serious public health and
safety problems. The Legislature should also consider the relationship
between concurrency and other state planning goals and provide for
appropriate exemptions from the concurrency requirement when nec-
essary or desirable to achieve the other goals.
Transportation has been the bane of concurrency's brief existence
for a variety of reasons. The construction of transportation facilities
is costly and time consuming, existing transportation deficiencies are
substantial, and local governments cannot control the volume of traf-
fic on roads that do not stop at jurisdictional boundary lines. Estab-
lishing appropriate levels of service for traffic is and has been a matter
of great controversy, and the state and local governments have vigor-
ously disagreed over whether the responsibility for setting those stan-
dards and funding transportation should be a state or local
responsibility.
However these jurisdictional disputes are resolved, Florida needs to
take a different and more realistic approach to transportation concur-
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rency, especially in urban areas. The Legislature should authorize an
areawide approach in urban areas that permits the designation of
transportation concurrency management districts, the determination
of concurrency by reference to a districtwide, average level of service
rather than on a road segment-by-segment basis, the limitation of ex-
isting deficiencies over a ten- or fifteen-year period, and the approval
of a development project so long as the developer contributes his or
her proportionate fair share of the costs of any traffic improvements
required by the development. This more flexible approach is justified
by the complexity of the transportation problem and by the fact that
traffic congestion is largely a matter of public convenience rather than
public health or safety. It would also help to avoid or defeat constitu-
tional attacks on transportation concurrency requirements. As with
any other approach to transportation, this approach should be linked
to a modern state transportation plan that recognizes the need for in-
tegrated, multimodal transportation systems with much greater em-
phasis on public transit.
The most glaring defect in the Florida concurrency system is the
Legislature's failure to resolve the issue of infrastructure funding. As
the Ramapo experience demonstrates, concurrency requirements can-
not be implemented without adequate revenue for local capital im-
provement programs, on which legitimate adequate public facilities
requirements must be based. In Florida the Legislature has failed not
only to provide adequate state funding for infrastructure, particularly
transportation, 425 but it has also greatly restricted local revenue
sources by requiring public referendum approval for the major local
option infrastructure taxes, making it difficult for local governments
to comply with this mandate. If local concurrency systems are to ac-
commodate rather than exclude growth and development, the Legisla-
ture must remove the referendum requirement for local option taxes
and complete the unfinished business of creating adequate state fund-
ing sources for infrastructure.
Local comprehensive plans adopted under Florida's growth man-
agement laws, and especially the concurrency systems which form
their core, may result in substantial restrictions on private property
rights. Consequently, constitutional challenges to concurrency based
on the Due Process, Equal Protection and Taking Clauses are inevita-
425. The Legislature did make some significant progress in funding transportation in the
1990 legislative session when it enacted a four-cent gas tax in most counties. Ch. 90-351, 1990
Fla. Laws 2960. However, this tax increase, which is expected to produce about $4 billion dollars
of transportation funding, is not nearly enough to cover Florida's estimated transportation needs
during the 1990s. Rhodes, supra note 40, at 36; STATE Co MPREsivw PLAN CoMMrrEE, supra
note 296, at 33-34.
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ble. However, the highly deferential standard of review afforded local
regulations under due process and equal protection jurisprudence mili-
tates against successful constitutional attacks except in the rare case of
highly irrational regulations. Similarly, the tests for evaluating taking
claims against concurrency regulations make success unlikely even un-
der the temporary takings doctrine of First English, except in egre-
gious cases of prolonged moratoria or governmental bad faith or
where the burden of curing existing infrastructure deficits is shifted to
the landowner as a condition of development approval. Properly de-
signed concurrency regulations can anticipate and avoid most of these
constitutional challenges.
A more effective landowner's remedy is needed to emphasize and
enforce local government's statutory obligation to provide the facili-
ties and services required by concurrency and to discourage inappro-
priate use of development moratoria. The Florida judiciary should
recognize a landowner's right to enforce the local government's com-
mitment to timely provide the facilities needed to satisfy concurrency
in accordance with the adopted capital improvements program. In ap-
propriate cases the landowner should be able to seek both injunctive
relief to compel provision of the facilities and compensatory damages
for totally unjustifiable delays. The Florida Legislature could establish
guidelines for such landowner actions. The Legislature should further
specify the conditions under which concurrency-related moratoria can
be imposed and require local governments to adopt judicially enforce-
able corrective actions or plans in order to terminate moratoria as
quickly as possible. Recognition of these landowner remedies and pro-
tections would help to ensure that the comprehensive plans used to
justify substantial restrictions on private property will in fact be im-
plemented.
Despite its flaws and some early difficulties in implementation, the
Florida concurrency system is an impressive achievement in both
scope and design. With little experience from other states to guide
them, Florida and its local governments are putting in place the
plans426 and regulations designed to ensure that the state grows in a
financially responsible manner. In a state accustomed to "building
now and paying later," the new concurrency system has engendered
much controversy. Nevertheless, it continues to enjoy strong public
426. As of January 20, 1992, all 457 of Florida's local governments had submitted plans to
the DCA for review. Two hundred seventy-six local plans have been found in compliance with
state law; 134 have been found not in compliance and 33 of those were the subject of negotiated
agreements with the DCA to bring them into compliance. The DCA was still reviewing the re-
maining 47 plans. William E. Sadowski, Changes Proposed for Florida's Growth Management
System, (Technical Memo, Vol. 7, No. 1, Feb. 1992), at 1, 1-2.
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and broad bipartisan support. Seven years after its enactment in 1985,
the statutory concurrency provisions remain undiluted despite intense
pressure on the Legislature to weaken them. In the author's view, the
survival of Florida's growth management legislation during the early
implementation years was due to strong continuing support from the
public, the statewide media, key state legislators, and Governor Bob
Martinez. Governor Martinez strongly supported the efforts of the
DCA to implement the state's growth management program, and he
consistently opposed proposals to weaken the legislation, particularly
the concurrency requirement.
Now the question is whether Florida government, both state and
local, can sustain the political will necessary to implement, fund, and
enforce the concurrency system it has created. In other words, will
Florida's commitment to its grand experiment be equal to the grand
ambition that launched it? As this Article goes to press, Florida's re-
solve is being tested by a severe economic recession that is being at-
tributed by some to the concurrency requirement. It is imperative that
Florida's political leaders resist such short-term pressures. As Gover-
nor Lawton Chiles recently stated in a letter to the Legislature:
Growth management is not just for good economic times, or when
it's easy or convenient. It's intended to change the way we do
business in Florida so that we don't repeat the mistakes of the past,
or suffer even greater economic distress in the future to the detriment
of our environment, our economy and our quality of life. 4 7
If the state's political leadership stays the course, the nation's most
ambitious growth management system, with some refinements and
proper funding, could also become its most successful.
427. Letter from Gov. Lawton Chiles to Sen. Pres. Gwen Margolis, Feb. 17, 1992 (available
at Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
